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Many of us rely on Google Translate and other Artificial Intelligence
and Machine Learning (AI) online translation daily for personal or
commercial use. These AI systems have become ubiquitous and are poised
to revolutionize human communication across the globe. Promising
increased fluency across cultures by breaking down linguistic barriers and
promoting cross-cultural relationships in a way that many civilizations
have historically sought and struggled to achieve, AI translation affords
users the means to turn any text—from phrases to books—into cognizable
expression.
This Article discusses the burgeoning possibilities in the 3A Era
(Advanced, Autonomous, AI systems) of AI online translation as
accessible tools, whose users are data suppliers and feedback providers,
and hence, contributors to the programing and improvement processes of
these translation tools. On the other hand, this Article also acknowledges
the real concerns this new realm raises, stemming from malicious uses of
AI, which are most often concealed from the public. Such hidden aspects
include built-in algorithmic biases, such as race, sex and gender, color,
religion, or national origin biases, which this Article addresses in a
discussion of AI systems’ systemic shortcomings. Because AI translation
systems learn and function through the data that they receive from data
providers, they are vulnerable to societal biases. When users offer
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feedback, these systems may perpetuate sexist, racist, or otherwise
objectionable expressions, of which other users, when consulting the
systems, are unaware.
Furthermore, examining the current copyright regime, this Article
claims, for the first time, that we, as users, have become inadvertent
infringers of legal rights since a translation, according to copyright law, is
a derivative work owned and controlled by the author. As such, an author’s
permission is necessary prior to the creation of a translation, with the
author in a position to collect payment when due. Moreover, under current
law, the Fair Use Doctrine is frequently inapplicable. This Article claims
that the legal and academic communities and policy makers have failed to
address AI translation systems within the copyright regime, and that this
failure renders the current copyright regime outdated and ill-equipped to
handle the advent of sophisticated AI tools. Additionally, this Article
states that the present inability of AI technology to routinely capture the
nuance of human prose gives rise to another concern. The ubiquitous role
such (as yet) flawed AI online translation systems play in translation
services, for personal or commercial purposes, should be better balanced
with the concerns of authors—who may worry about the linguistic
integrity of an AI translation of their work—and their rights, in certain
circumstances, to control translations of their work and object to
unauthorized AI translations.
Understanding the concerns attending unauthorized AI translations
under the current copyright regime, while still recognizing that users
should be able to profit from the wellspring of literacy which AI
translation offers, this Article argues for a harmonization of AI translation
with amended copyright protection.
To that end, this Article calls on policymakers to adjust the current
legal regime to include advanced technologies and suggests new principles
for combining legal tools with existing technology. Such an approach
would better balance the benefits of accessible AI translation systems with
the requirements of a modified, modern copyright regime via the
implementation of a method coined “fair use and equality by design.”
Additionally, by recognizing the conflicting interests at stake, this Article
invites international policymakers, such as WIPO (the World Intellectual
Property Organization), to promote the development of international
standardized guidelines for the use of AI translation systems, and possibly
other AI systems, by emphasizing fair use exemptions and limitations.
This Article concludes that by understanding the significant
drawbacks of AI translation systems and adopting the suggested
principles, policymakers can promote access to an evolving AI
technology, while also recognizing the integrity of authors’ linguistic
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choices and preserving the beauty of linguistic diversity—which, as the
ancient story of Babel hinted, is valuable because of, not despite, the
challenges it poses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Linguistic barriers have frustrated people for thousands of years. In
the famous story of the Tower of Babel, Genesis 11:1–9 describes how
“the whole earth had one language and the same words” until its denizens
sought to build “a tower with its top in the heavens,” and God intervened
to curtail this excessive ambition, saying, “Come, let us go down, and
confuse their language there, so that they will not understand one another’s
speech.”1 From then on, according to biblical history, the world’s
inhabitants were scattered across the globe, unable to understand each
other’s languages.2 Recently, however, Google Translate and other webbased AI translation systems have disrupted this narrative by allowing
people to quickly access translations online.3
Though it can be tempting to think translations require no more than
replacing a word in one language with the corresponding word in another,

1. 7 Genesis 11:1–9 (New Revised Standard Version).
2. Id.
3. See generally Gideon Lewis-Kraus, Is Translation an Art or a Math Problem?, N.Y. TIMES
(June 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/is-translation-an-art-or-a-mathproblem.html [https://perma.cc/X8EC-DTPM].
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this has never been true.4 Translations are as powerful and complex as the
languages and the advanced technology that produce them.5
In 2006, Google launched its online Google Translate service. Since
then, this tool has become ubiquitous, as users easily and frequently turn
to the world’s dominant search engine to translate everything from quick
phrases to lengthy texts.6 Though the benefits and convenience of Google
Translate and other similar programs are obvious, their use has caused
large swathes of the global population to become inadvertent infringers of
copyright law because legally authors, and not users or search engines,
have the exclusive right to control translations of their works. Even the
American Fair Use Doctrine does not present a consistently good defense
to this use of corporate translation platforms, which do not limit the
amount of works users can borrow. What is more, because such platforms
make money off of users’ translation queries, their use of the original
works is commercial and possibly supplants the market for an authorized
translation.
The question then becomes whether the traditional copyright regime
can meet the challenges of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
(AI) online translation systems,7 or whether this regime is outdated and in

4. See Cassandra L. McKeown & Michael G. Miller, Say What?: South Dakota’s Unsettling
Indifference to Linguistic Minorities in the Courtroom, 54 S.D. L. REV. 33, 41–42 (2009)
(“Historically, courts have embraced the ‘conduit theory’ of interpretation. This theory views the
interpreter as a machine into which one language enters and another language exits . . . . Regardless
of the cause, the bench and bar regularly underestimate the difficulty of facilitating accurate
communication between languages and cultures.”); see also Stella Szantova Giordano, Note, It’s All
Greek to Me: Are Attorneys Who Engage in or Procure Legal Translation for Their Clients at Risk of
Committing an Ethical Violation?, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 447, 448 (2013) (“While the legal
community often assumes that legal translation is merely a simple and straightforward mechanical
process, akin to an administrative function, linguists and comparative lawyers vehemently disagree.
Any type of foreign language translation is an inherently imperfect and imprecise process.”).
5. See Lewis-Kraus, supra note 3.
6. Id. (“Google Translate is far and away the venture that has done the most to realize the old
science-fiction dream of serene, unrippled exchange. The search giant has made ubiquitous those little
buttons, in email and on websites, that deliver instantaneous conversion between language pairs.
Google says the service is used more than a billion times a day worldwide, by more than 500 million
people a month.”).
7. In this Article, we will use the phrases AI and ML interchangeably to refer to online translation
programs. See Debora Person, AI Application in the Practice of Law, WYO. LAW., Aug. 2017, at 50
(“Artificial intelligence is an umbrella term. It refers to natural language processing and machine
learning functions.”). For a discussion of artificial intelligence systems in general and the intellectual
property regime, see Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence,
Copyright, and Accountability in the 3A Era—The Human-Like Workers Are Already Here—A New
Model, 4 MICH. ST. L. REV. 659 (2017) [hereinafter Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt]
(discussing artificial intelligence systems that produce works of art and suggesting that the work-forhire doctrine would allow for imposing accountability and ownership on the user); see also Shlomit
Yanisky-Ravid & Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu, When Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions:
An Alternative Model for Patent Law at the 3a Era, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2223–24 (2018)
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need of amendment or replacement. Copyright is not, however, the only
issue web translation tools raise. Because online translation tools
predominantly rely on AI, their end products are vulnerable to algorithmic
biases users are often unaware of; widespread reliance on incorrect
translations can perpetuate discrimination, facilitate rights violations, and
lead users to communicate with prejudiced or inappropriate terminology.8
AI online translation tools are by far among the most accessible and
user-friendly of AI systems, translating with just a few clicks of a mouse
or taps on a smartphone screen. As advanced technology tools have
developed rapidly, AI translation systems have also become available on
newer devices, including, reportedly, Amazon’s virtual assistant Alexa
and Apple’s well-known Siri.9 Popular AI translation tools such as Google
Translate, Microsoft Translator, DeepL or Systran, among many other
options, transfer written materials including emails, advertisements, news,
articles, songs, literature, books, and lectures from one language into
another. These tools create derivative works by translating copyrighted
written materials with just a quick click.10 In many ways, by eliminating
linguistic hurdles and enabling international communication, this
advanced technology revives questions at the heart of the Biblical story of
the Tower of Babel.
Interpretations of the story of Babel are varied. What was it about the
building of the tower that warranted divine interference? Why did God’s
intervention consist of sowing such widespread linguistic confusion?
Theories abound: some suggest that God was distressed by the dangerous
potential for people using “the same words” to exhibit a uniformity of
thought, rather than promoting diversity, which is beneficiary to the
growth and the development of humankind.11 Others argue that the tower

(describing the use of AI systems to produce creative works and the applicability of intellectual
property laws, which in some ways have become irrelevant and outdated, with a focus on patent law).
8. See infra note 146.
9. See, e.g., Dave Gershgorn, Cultural Context Is the Hardest Part of Speaking a Foreign
Language. Amazon’s Alexa Could Change That, QUARTZ (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://qz.com/1219383/amazon-alexas-language-translation-ai-will-reportedly-learn-culturalcontext [https://perma.cc/BS5Y-SYF5] (citing a report from Yahoo Finance suggesting that Amazon
“is looking to amp up Alexa’s translation skills, by also including how to respond to cultural norms”).
10. See Lewis-Kraus, supra note 3.
11. Shai Held, The Babel Story is About the Dangers of Uniformity, CHRISTIAN CENTURY (Oct.
24, 2017), https://www.christiancentury.org/article/critical-essay/the-babel-story-is-about-dangersuniformity [https://perma.cc/PT29-U72G]; see also YESHAYAHU LEIBOWITZ, SEVEN YEARS OF
CONVERSATIONS OVER THE WEEKLY TORAH PORTION 1976–1982, at 30–35 (Ben Zion Mishael
Nuriel ed., 2000); Andrea Cantor, Babel: The Biblical Imperative for Diversity, JEWISH EXPONENT
(Apr. 18, 2013), http://jewishexponent.com/2013/04/18/babel-the-biblical-imperative-for-diversity
[https://perma.cc/F9UX-U9FM].
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symbolized mankind’s “arrogant pursuit of fame and power.”12 It is also
true that humanity gained tremendously from the emergence of different
languages and dialects, each of which is connected to a particular place
and culture. Nevertheless, to the popular imagination, Babel, a mysterious
story “among the most famous in the Bible,”13 often represents a tragic
loss of communication among people—a barrier and source of
divisiveness.14 Perhaps this loss explains the impassioned promotion of AI
online translation systems as revolutionary tools poised to return the world
to a pre-Babel era by creating an online bridge across languages—one that
enhances communication and supports peace.15 On the other hand, in
addition to transforming virtually all users into unwitting copyright
infringers, these systems can also produce inaccurate and biased
translations that reflect poorly on their creators and users alike, not to
mention the original authors whose works new readers encounter for the
first time in translated form.
This Article, therefore, discusses the challenges that AI translation
tools pose to users, authors, and copyright law. As these systems have
become omnipresent, insufficient attention has been paid to the copyright
regime, to the need to incentivize authors while promoting the public
welfare, to the importance of accurate translations, and to the right of
authors to object to adulteration of their works. This Article argues that in
the “3A era” (namely, that of Advanced, Automatic, and Autonomous AI
systems), intellectual property policymakers should specifically address
online translation to eliminate legal confusion and better balance
conflicting needs. The interests at stake include those of the public, which
benefits from easily accessible translation tools, of authors, who have the
right to control the use of their works, and of technology firms, which
currently profit from free access to both user data and author material.
Since translation consists of converting one language to another, and since
the use of AI translation systems has reached global proportions, so, too,
are the legal challenges these systems pose in a global scope. A
comparative legal awareness and analysis are therefore necessary to
develop a unified solution reflective of differences in national regulation.
12. Jan Christian Gertz, The Tower of Babel (Gen 11:1–9), BIBLE ODYSSEY (Feb. 7, 2019),
http://www.bibleodyssey.com/passages/main-articles/tower-of-babel [https://perma.cc/J26R-C624].
13. Brent A. Strawn, Holes in the Tower of Babel, OXFORD BIBLICAL STUD. ONLINE,
https://global.oup.com/obso/focus/focus_on_towerbabel (last visited Sept. 17, 2019).
14. See Lewis-Kraus, supra note 3 (“It is a dream that harks back to Genesis, of a common
tongue that perfectly maps thought to world. In Scripture, this allowed for a humanity so well
coordinated, so alike in its understanding, that all the world’s subcontractors could agree on a time to
build a tower to the heavens. Since Babel, though, even the smallest construction projects are plagued
by terrible delays.”).
15. Id.
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Although many of the materials being translated online are
copyrightable assets, users of AI translation tools do not generally contact
rightsholders for permission, and thus have neither obtained licenses to
use the works nor paid royalties for them. As a result, on an everyday basis
many are violating copyright law. This Article assumes that a majority of
users are not aware of the legal protections afforded to translations.
Translation is explicitly defined in the Copyright Act as a derivative work,
whose copyrights belongs to the author (or to an author-approved person
or entity).16 We argue that these routine infringements further weaken the
validity and influence of copyright, which has been damaged by a
libertarian internet philosophy that totally ignores authorship and
accuracy.17 While undoubtedly many applications of AI translation
constitute fair use by individual internet users, it is unclear why wealthy
technology companies such as Google, Amazon, and Microsoft should
have free access to authors’ derivative rights. Copyright is a balancing act
that aims to protect free expression and serve the public welfare by
providing creative individuals with limited-time incentives to share the
fruits of their labor. By ignoring the conflicts of AI translation, lawmakers
are spreading confusion—which is only likely to grow as AI develops
further—and undermining copyright law, which becomes meaningless if
not enforced.
We acknowledge that our arguments raise conflict between
traditional copyright protections and the benefits of advanced
technology—one which no one wants to confront, despite the fact that
most users are technically violating current copyright law when they
engage with Google Translate. However, we do not advocate for the
elimination of AI translation tools, or for an overly expansive version of
copyright law. Instead, we argue that the law must better reconcile the
interests of the different stakeholders in order for the “Progress of Science
and useful Arts”18 to flourish for the benefit of all. We call for a re-thinking
of copyright laws that stresses the importance of both AI translation tools
and copyright ideals by implementing principles of proportionality and
reasonableness. Given the inherently international nature of the internet

16. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2018). “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
17. See, e.g., 63 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 1 (2001) (discussing copyright infringement by
file sharing on the internet).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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and translation, we posit that the best solution will involve input from
comparative and international lawmakers.
This Article both recognizes the value of AI translation systems and
questions their unfettered use, which—as stressed—leads to copyright
violations and unreliable, potentially biased language. Following the
discussion of this state of affairs and its attendant concerns, we make
several recommendations. First, a combination of digital and legal tools
should balance the competing interests at stake. Second, a new AI
translation system paradigm requires greater consideration for authors’
rights in translations of their works; however, it should not sacrifice the
important goal of facilitating cross-cultural exchange online. Thus,
policymakers should allow free use of AI translation programs, while
limiting the amount and type of content that may be translated
automatically online in conjunction with software designers building AI
translation platforms to reflect these constraints; in other words, programs
should respect copyright by adopting a fair use design. Lawmakers should
also require AI translation services to allow authors to opt out of having
their webpages translated automatically. Third, policymakers should
publish norms and guidelines clarifying the extent to which the Fair Use
Doctrine covers AI online translation services and when infringements of
the law occur. The industry should then update its practices to adhere to
the rules. Fourth, given the internet’s intrinsically global reach, and given
that AI translation programs raise copyright concerns in many
jurisdictions, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) should
develop guidelines for these programs’ use. United States lawmakers
should closely examine the ways in which various jurisdictions have
addressed conflicts between new technology online and copyright law and
consider how to involve the international community in a workable
solution. This framework will close the current gap in the enforcement of
copyright law and better preserve the balanced interests the law has long
sought to achieve.
These proposals are based on the well-established need to align the
general public’s right to access knowledge and the arts with the rights of
authors to profit from their original creative endeavors for a limited time.19
Careful calibration of these rights is crucial. Insufficient protection of
authors discourages them from publishing their works, thus creating a loss

19. Id.
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for global society.20 However, unlimited copyright protection of original
works may stymie technological progress.21
Finally, this paper challenges an underlying premise popular among
those who argue wholesale against any enforcement of copyright
limitations on automated translation programs: namely, that linguistic
variation is an unnecessary encumbrance that should be vanquished
whenever and however possible. While translations play an important role
in communicating and sharing knowledge, culture, and experience, the
success and value of translations hinge on a cultural sensitivity that
machines still lack.22 We argue that making translations widely accessible
without paying attention to the quality of the language that actually
conveys the information within the underlying text not only infringes on
authors’ rights, but also ignores the beautiful complexity of human
language—far from being a problem, such complexity merits celebration.
In summary, the first Part of this Article traces the controversial
history of translation and discusses the elements of good translations. The
second Part examines the mechanics of AI translation systems and their
ability to learn as they accumulate data, which users increasingly
contribute, as well as the limitations of AI translation. The third Part
addresses the ways in which AI translations may be biased. The fourth Part
explores how the Derivative Works Doctrine has been applied to
translations done by humans and considers the implications of classifying
AI translations as derivative works. The fifth Part re-examines copyright
law and its theoretical justifications in both the United States and other
jurisdictions and challenges lawmakers to better regulate the use of AI
translation systems to protect the interests of various stakeholders. The
final Part posits the need for new legal and digital tools to address the
copyright problems posed by AI translation online.

20. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 483, 485 (1996) (“[D]efining the appropriate scope of copyright has entailed an examination of
incentives and access. Broadening the scope of copyright increases the incentive to produce works of
authorship and results in a greater variety of such works. Broadening copyright’s scope, however, also
limits access to such works both generally, by increasing their price, and specifically, by limiting the
material that others can use to create additional works. Given these competing considerations, defining
copyright’s proper scope has become a matter of balancing the benefits of broader protection, in the
form of increased incentive to produce such works, against its costs, in the form of lost access to such
works.”).
21. Id.
22. See infra notes 67–71.
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II. TRANSLATION IN PERSPECTIVE: FROM THE BIBLE TO GOOGLE
TRANSLATE
Translation has a long and contentious history. As translator David
Bellos remarked, “War, diplomacy, trade, and exploration are activities
where trust is both crucial and difficult to grant . . . [i]f you don’t know the
language of your enemy or your partner, you depend entirely on people
who do—and there’s nothing like dependency to foster resentment and
fear.”23 The perception of translation as a tool to build bridges between
cultures has never been universally adopted. Taking a historical view
allows us to consider just how heated fights over the legitimacy of
translation have been.
A. The Controversial History of Translation
The Bible is among the most read, sold, and translated books in the
history of the world.24 It is also among the most controversial, with
suspicion running rampant among believers who fear that the translations
and interpretations of opposing sects aim to undermine the true faith.25
Yet, “much of the Western theory and practice of translation stems
immediately from the need to disseminate the Gospels.”26
As the printing press made it easier to share written knowledge in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, tensions arose between European
Catholics and members of the Protestant Reformation.27 William Tyndale,
the first man to produce a complete English version of the Bible in print,
was strangled and burned at the stake in 1536 for a translation that
challenged the Roman Catholic Church.28 The same year, Jacob van
Liesveldt, who translated the first Dutch Bible, was beheaded.29 Centuries
later, during the Philadelphia Bible Riots, violence erupted between
23. DAVID BELLOS, IS THAT A FISH IN YOUR EAR?, at 117 (2011).
24. Best-Selling Book of Non-Fiction, GUINNESS WORLD RECS., http://www.guinness
worldrecords.com/world-records/best-selling-book-of-non-fiction
[https://perma.cc/HJ5L-R56S]
(“Although it is impossible to obtain exact figures, there is little doubt that the Bible is the world’s
best-selling and most widely distributed book.”).
25. See, e.g., HARRY FREEDMAN, THE MURDEROUS HISTORY OF BIBLE TRANSLATIONS: POWER,
CONFLICT, AND THE QUEST FOR MEANING 14 (1st ed. 2016) (“Although both the Jewish and Christian
sources affirmed the miraculous nature of the translation, they did so for very different reasons.
Irenaeus had said that it was so the Jewish translators couldn’t collude and falsify the Bible. The Jewish
sources claimed it was to eliminate the possibility of people reading ideas into the Hebrew text that
weren’t there.”).
26. GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE & TRANSLATION 257 (3d ed.
1998).
27. See Stanislav Getmanenko, Freedom from the Press: Why the Federal Propaganda
Prohibition Act of 2005 Is A Good Idea, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 251, 258–59 n.38 (2009) (“The printing
press was the ‘catalyst for Protestant Reformation, the Renaissance, and the Industrial Revolution.’”).
28. FREEDMAN, supra note 25, at 1, 112.
29. Id.
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“nativist” Protestants and the local Catholic community following a
bishop’s request that Catholic children be allowed to read the DouayReims translation of the Bible at school.30
Oral translation (i.e., interpretation) has also long played an
important role in world affairs.31 Between the fifteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the Ottoman Empire relied on young men trained in Western
languages, such as Italian—many of them from Greek-speaking, Roman
Catholic communities—to assist in primarily oral, multilingual
diplomacy.32 When these young men needed to prepare written
translations of matters at hand, they followed their usual practices for oral
interpretation, altering the Turkish pasha’s language to a form best suited
to achieving his diplomatic goals; the stakes were high, as disloyalty was
punishable by death.33 In 1821, in fact, a Grand Dragoman named Stavraki
Aristarchi was hanged for treason after Greek provinces of the Ottoman
Empire revolted: the pasha, it seems, could not trust the translators.34
In his memoir Translating History, Igor Korchilov recounted his
years spent as a Russian-English conference interpreter who worked
extensively with the United Nations and Soviet leaders, such as Mikhail
Gorbachev, during the Cold War.35 According to Korchilov, a fundamental
quality for interpreters is “what in Russian is called perevoploscheniye, or
the ability to put oneself in the speaker’s shoes, to become his
döppelganger, as it were, to catch the essence of his message and not
simply repeat what he is saying in another language.”36 Yet, interpreters
also face immense pressure when their interlocutors are negotiating
nuclear peace and national security; Korchilov describes one Russian
interpreter who, while interpreting a speech by Ronald Reagan for
Gorbachev and other Russian leaders in 1987 in Washington, D.C.,
translated the word adversaries in the phrase, “a coming together not of
allies, but of adversaries,” as “competitors.”37 Not unlike the Turkish
interpreters from centuries past, this interpreter was “[o]bviously aware of
the potential fallout the direct translation of the word would have had on
the Soviet audience” at a time when all were seeking to end the Cold
War.38
30. See generally Amanda Beyer-Purvis, The Philadelphia Bible Riots of 1844: Contest Over
the Rights of Citizens, 83 PA. HIST. 366 (2016) (discussing the causes and context of the Philadelphia
Bible Riots).
31. See BELLOS, supra note 23, at 121.
32. Id. at 122–25.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 127.
35. IGOR KORCHILOV, TRANSLATING HISTORY (1997).
36. Id. at 21.
37. Id. at 65.
38. Id.
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Translation disputes persist today. In 2017, The New York Times
Magazine published a lengthy article about a new English translation of
the Odyssey by classicist Emily Wilson, in which she explained her
controversial choice of the word “complicated” for the ancient Greek
polytropos in the story’s famed opening lines, where other translators had
used more elaborate, if no less uniform, phrases such as “for wisdom’s
various arts renown’d,” “of wide-ranging spirit,” and “so wary and
wise.”39 The political nature of translations also received attention when
United States President Donald Trump gave a speech before the United
Nations General Assembly, and an Iranian interpreter took significant
liberties in his rendition of the remarks in Farsi.40
The Wycliffe Global Alliance, which aims to make the Bible
accessible to as many people as possible in as many languages as required,
notes that translation:
is more than finding out what the biblical text says and saying it in
the other language. Translation is a process of discovering what was
understood in the original setting and discerning the degree to which
readers or hearers in the new context will be able to arrive at a similar
understanding.41

Translating, therefore, is not—and never has been—a neutral activity; how
a concept is converted from one language to another shapes reader or listener perceptions and may serve political ends.
B. Language Barriers and Copyright
The Babel story’s sense of awe and frustration with language barriers
does not stand alone. In the late nineteenth century, well before the
existence of online AI translation (or virtually any automated translation),
a Polish physician named Ludwig L. Zamenhof introduced Esperanto to

39. Wyatt Mason, The First Woman to Translate the ‘Odyssey’ Into English, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Nov. 2, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2iTUP84 [https://perma.cc/7D7Y-5P2E]. The journalist who
interviewed Wilson observed, “You might be inclined to suppose that, over the course of nearly half
a millennium, we must have reached a consensus on the English equivalent for an old Greek word,
polytropos. But to consult Wilson’s 60 some predecessors, living and dead, is to find that consensus
has been hard to come by.” Id.
40. Chris Bell et al., Iranian Interpreter Defends Trump Speech Omissions, BBC (Sept. 21,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41347217 [https://perma.cc/Q79B-2B8X]. In
this case, “[The Islamic Republic of Iran] has turned a wealthy country, with a rich history and culture,
into an economically depleted rogue state whose chief exports are violence, bloodshed and chaos” was
translated to “[i]n our opinion, the life of Iranians could be better.” Id.
41. Bible Translation Statistics – Frequently Asked Questions, WYCLIFFE GLOBAL ALLIANCE
(Nov. 2013), http://resources.wycliffe.net/statistics/2013/WycliffeGA_stats_FAQs_EN.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7QHC-T5CJ].
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the world.42 Zamenhof hoped that Esperanto, an artificial language that
drew heavily from Romance languages, would promote greater
intercultural understanding.43 Though the name “Esperanto” is derived
from the Latin root for “hope,” the language never flourished.44 Today,
Google Translate has taken up the torch by encouraging users to “[s]peak
with the world.”45 Meanwhile, Microsoft Translator recently included
Tamil in its repertoire in an effort to “help[] break the language barrier of
communication worldwide and within the Indian subcontinent itself.”46
Writing about the copyright issues of online translation systems over
a decade ago, Erik Ketzan argued that these systems “increase social
interaction across cultures and languages, possibly dramatically.”47
Therefore, he maintained that such programs should be legally noninfringing, or at least facilitated by the creation of effective licenses, noting
that “[i]t is easy to imagine a future in which we seamlessly surf the
entirety of the internet in our native language, with occasional (or
frequent) linguistic mistakes being the only indication that we are reading
machine-translated text.”48 We agree that AI translation systems have
great potential. They can facilitate international communication in some
settings and perhaps limit the human tendency to demonize others.49
Accessible AI translation systems can also help people forge economically
beneficial partnerships and collaborations. From a social perspective,
accessible translation systems can be highly valuable tools, especially in
the present globalized era, in which many people work for international

42. Olivia B. Waxman, The Serious History Behind Esperanto, TIME (July 26, 2016),
http://time.com/4417809/esperanto-history-invention [https://perma.cc/4GTZ-KU2W] (“[A] wave of
anti-Semitism underscored Zamenhof’s thinking that the world needed a single language that would
make it possible for people to bridge gaps of religion or ethnicity.”).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. About, GOOGLE TRANSLATE, https://translate.google.com/intl/en/about [https://perma.
cc/8NGE-KZJG].
46. Microsoft Translator, Microsoft Translator Adds Tamil as a Supported Language,
MICROSOFT: MICROSOFT TRANSLATOR BLOG (Oct. 24, 2017), https://blogs.msdn.microsoft
.com/translation/2017/10/24/microsoft-translator-adds-tamil [https://perma.cc/XA25-PU7R].
47. Erik Ketzan, Rebuilding Babel: Copyright and the Future of Online Machine Translation, 9
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 205, 218 (2007).
48. Id.
49. TORGEIR M. HILLESTAD, U. STAVANGER, THE METAPSYCHOLOGY OF EVIL: MAIN
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND CRITIQUE 43 (2014), https://brage.
bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/274771/Rapport_47.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/B3
SW-44M8]. “In fact, a main function of the group itself is often to build up a barrier between the
‘good-us’ and the ‘bad-others’ . . . . We systematically strip the ‘others’, the opposition, of any human
qualities for which we might have empathy or compassion. The ‘others’ are thus demonized as the
very embodiment of evil.” Id.
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companies outside their home country.50 Our wide-scale multilingual
sharing of information is unprecedented and has no doubt exposed people
to material they might otherwise never have encountered.51
However, unlike Ketzan, we believe that AI translation systems’
complete eschewing of copyright law is just one of their significant,
though infrequently discussed, drawbacks. Rather than blindly favoring
technology over all other rights, we argue that the intellectual property
framework requires a new model to address the competing interests at
stake. More than a decade after Ketzan published his piece, there is still a
huge legal vacuum in this field. Users routinely violate the intellectual
property rights of third parties when they engage with AI online translation
systems to transfer, for example, full webpages from one language to
another, while also freely giving away their data to for-profit corporations
in the process, with no real understanding of how companies use that data
and how long it is stored. Privacy concerns aside, the continued
inaccuracies of AI translation are also problematic, both for authors—
whose works the process of translation may deform—and for users, who
may unwittingly make offensive statements stemming from algorithmic
bias. Human language and intercultural communication, it seems, do not
easily fit into the tidy compartments of AI translation.
Additionally, as Ketzan acknowledges, by reducing the world’s
wealth of languages to a single, off-key tongue, AI translation systems
may discourage users from experiencing “foreign travel, music, and
literature in the original language”52 to the detriment of collective diversity
and inner enrichment, as culture is strongly intertwined with language.53
Essentially, although linguistic differences may frustrate us, they also
foster innovation and allow societies around the world to find unique
cultural expression. In our enthusiastic embrace of new technologies, we
should not lose sight of the value of difference, even when it poses
challenges.

50. See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, A Lifeline Not Made in the U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/business/18excerpt.html
[https://perma.cc/U7EB-8KFU]
(discussing the “millions of Americans” who work for foreign companies operating in the United
States).
51. See Margot E. Kaminski & Dr. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, The Marrakesh Treaty for Visually
Impaired Persons: Why A Treaty Was Preferable to Soft Law, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 255 (2014)
[hereinafter Kaminski & Yanisky-Ravid, Marrakesh Treaty].
52. Ketzan, supra note 47, at 218–19.
53. “One of the best ways to learn objective facts about a culture is to study its language, as
language courses tend to immerse students in multiple aspects of a society’s objective culture,
including its history, literature, and art. Knowledge of a language also provides insight into a social
group’s perception of reality.” Walter A. Wright, Practical Steps for Acquiring Cross-Cultural
Negotiation Skills, 70 TEX. B.J. 590, 590 (2007).
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C. What Makes Translation Good? When is AI Translation Bad?
Italian writer Italo Calvino—who translated the works of French
author Raymond Queneau54—once observed that “translating is the real
way to read a text . . . for an author, reflecting on the translation of a text
he has written, discussing it with the translator, is the real way to read his
own work, to understand what he has written and why.”55 In his book, Dire
Quasi la Stessa Cosa: Esperienze di Traduzione (“Saying Almost the Same
Thing: Experiences in Translation”), Umberto Eco mused that if we can
agree that a good translation says “almost the same thing” as its source,
we are still left pondering “how elastic must that ‘almost’ be?”56 The
sensitivity to the language and style required for translation is evidenced
by the number of translators who were also prolific writers, including
Calvino, Eco, Charles Baudelaire, Cesare Pavese, Vladimir Nabokov, Jose
Luis Borges, and Dorothy L. Sayers.57
Good translations allow people to share ideas, creativity, criticism,
culture, and literature with a wider audience, improving access to
knowledge and debate. The world would be a darker place if English
speakers could not read Anna Karenina and Spanish scientists could not
study the works of Albert Einstein. Quality and accuracy matter, however,
and largely depend on the fluency of translators in the cultures of the
languages they are working with.58 When people communicate, they do so
by making certain statements and leaving others unsaid; what a reader
understands or a listener hears will often depend on community norms.59

54. RAYMOND QUENEAU, I FIORI BLU (Italo Calvino trans., 2014).
55. ITALO CALVINO, MONDO SCRITTO E MONDO NON SCRITTO 80 (2002).
56. UMBERTO ECO, DIRE QUASI LA STESSA COSA: ESPERIENZE DI TRADUZIONE 10 (Bompiani
4th ed. 2016).
57. See About Dorothy L Sayers, DOROTHY L. SAYERS SOC’Y, https://www.sayers
.org.uk/biography [https://perma.cc/P83G-SYQC]; Richard D.E. Burton, Charles Baudelaire,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Charles-Baudelaire [https://
perma.cc/D6FT-3VCZ]; Cesare Pavese, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA (Sept. 5, 2019),
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Cesare-Pavese [https://perma.cc/23MD-9KLY]; Huw Nesbitt,
Jorge Luis Borges’s Lost Translations, GUARDIAN: BOOKS BLOG (Feb. 19, 2010),
https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2010/feb/19/jorge-luis-borges-di-giovanni [https://
perma.cc/8QHV-C3J3]; Vladimir Nabokov, The Art of Translation, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 4, 1941),
https://newrepublic.com/article/62610/the-art-translation [https://perma.cc/5XBE-RPLC] .
58. See Sarah Yates, Scaling the Tower of Babel Fish: An Analysis of the Machine Translation
of Legal Information, 98 L. LIBR. J. 481, 482 (2006) (“Anyone who has attempted to translate a
document by simply looking up each word in a bilingual dictionary realizes that this method does not
work. The translator must understand the language at the morphological, lexical, and syntactical
levels; some would argue that understanding at the cultural level is equally indispensable.”).
59. See Gideon Toury, The Nature and Role of Norms in Translation, in THE TRANSLATION
STUDIES READER 198 (Lawrence Venuti ed., 2000) (“Translation activities should rather be regarded
as having cultural significance. Consequently, ‘translatorship’ amounts first and foremost to being
able to play a social role, i.e., to fulfil a function allotted by a community . . . in a way which is deemed
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Japanese culture, for example, considers saying “no” directly to be rude;
yet the country’s cultural norms still afford citizens a linguistic means to
decline dinner invitations, for example, in a way that would-be hosts may
congenially comprehend.60 Good translators are not only sensitive to
cultural differences, they are also fluent enough in both languages to
capture variations in formality, humor, idiomatic expressions, the positive
or negative connotations of words, and the musicality of certain sounds,
among other important factors.61 They make deliberate choices about
whether and to what extent a text should retain foreign sounds, images,
and words, and if a text should read as though it had not been translated at
all.62
In addition, languages are constantly evolving, and our
understanding of words continues to change over time.63 For example, in
the early twentieth century in the United States, the word “Negro” was
considered polite and unremarkable—it was, after all, in the name of the
United Negro College Fund, and the title of eminent black historian and
civil rights activist W.E.B. Du Bois’s study, The Philadelphia Negro—but
today it is perceived as dated, condescending, and racist.64 As linguist
George Steiner noted, “[a]ny thorough reading of a text out of the past of
one’s own language and literature is a manifold act of interpretation.”65
Like readers of major works of literature, good translators must pay
attention to the time in which a text was written in order to capture an
author’s intended meaning.66 All of these tasks are difficult, if not
appropriate in its own terms of reference.”). See generally LIVES IN TRANSLATION: BILINGUAL
WRITERS ON IDENTITY AND CREATIVITY (Isabelle de Courtivron ed., 2003).
60. JON P. ALSTON & ISAO TAKEI, JAPANESE BUSINESS CULTURE AND PRACTICES: A GUIDE TO
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY JAPANESE BUSINESS 43 (2005) (“It is best not to ask a Japanese a question
demanding either a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. Because Japanese do not like to say ‘no,’ such a question is
answered either by a ‘yes’ or by a vague statement that does not obligate the speaker. Saying ‘no’
bluntly is considered impolite and aggressive.”).
61. See, e.g., APRILIA ZANK, THE WORD IN THE WORD: LITERARY TEXT RECEPTION AND
LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY 158 (2013) (“The first prerequisite for a competent translator is, doubtlessly,
very good command of both the target language . . . and the source.”).
62. See BELLOS, supra note 23, at 44–59.
63. Robin I. M. Dunbar, The Origin and Subsequent Evolution of Language, in LANGUAGE
EVOLUTION (Morten H. Christiansen and Simon Kirby eds., 2003) (“Language has two remarkable
properties. First, it allows us to communicate ideas with each other; second, languages evolve and
diversify with a speed and facility that is quite unique within biological evolution.”).
64. See, e.g., Tess Owen, The Words ‘Oriental’ and ‘Negro’ Can No Longer be Used in US
Federal Laws, VICE (May 21, 2016), https://news.vice.com/article/the-words-oriental-and-negro-canno-longer-be-used-in-us-federal-laws [https://perma.cc/3F6R-XCQH] (“The law targets two antidiscrimination areas of US law that use antiquated language to describe racial or ethnic groups.”).
65. STEINER, supra note 26, at 18. This work provides a lengthy analysis of the significance of
languages and translation.
66. See Peter Messent, Censoring Mark Twain’s ‘N-Words’ Is Unacceptable, GUARDIAN (Jan.
5, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2011/jan/05/censoring-mark-twain-n-wordunacceptable [https://perma.cc/K79H-3AW8] (arguing that although Mark Twain used the word
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impossible, for an AI translation program to achieve with fluency because
such work requires in-depth understanding, not merely a statistical
analysis of data.
In fact, although AI translation tools have dramatically improved and
continue to evolve, they are often unreliable and might always remain so.
Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, a well-known Israeli mathematician and linguist,
spent years working at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
developing machine translation, but even he expressed doubts about the
feasibility of fully automatic, high quality translation systems.67 “By not
realizing the practical futility” of the goal of perfect machine translation,
Bar-Hillel argued that its enthusiasts had misled themselves, and the
agencies sponsoring their research, into believing that the “real thing” (the
perfect and efficient translation) was just around the corner.68 Bar-Hillel
stressed that it would have made more sense to consider the potential
applications for imperfect automated translation systems.69
Although nearly sixty years have passed since Bar-Hillel published
his paper in 1960, not much has changed. Recently, translator Douglas
Hofstadter illustrated the inability of Google Translate to accurately
translate simple sentences that would not have posed much of a challenge
to sufficiently fluent human translators.70 The problem, he argued, was that
“[m]achine translation has never focused on understanding language.
Instead, the field has always tried to ‘decode’—to get away without
worrying about what understanding and meaning are.”71 A lack of
precision, an inability to perceive nuance, and the lack of an “ear” for
language might afflict some human translators, but these problems are
inherent for machines. Understanding the fascinating processes underlying
AI translation systems, which we discuss later in this Article, helps explain
the persistence of these problems.72
The standards of reliability used for the translation of court
documents provide a good metric for evaluating the reliability of AI
translation systems from a legal perspective. If the latter is appropriate
only in limited circumstances, where quality and accuracy are of
“nigger” many times in Huckleberry Finn, the novel should be understood as anti-racist and the word
should not be edited out).
67. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, A Demonstration of the Nonfeasibility of Fully Automatic High Quality
Translation, in LANGUAGE AND INFORMATION 174–79 (1964). See generally Yehoshua Bar-Hillel,
Some Linguistic Problems Connected with Machine Translation, 20 PHIL. SCI. 217 (1953).
68. Bar-Hillel, supra note 67.
69. Bar-Hillel, supra note 67.
70. Douglas Hofstadter, The Shallowness of Google Translate, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/01/the-shallowness-of-googletranslate/551570 [https://perma.cc/Y2X9-HX4J].
71. Id.
72. See infra Part III.
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secondary importance, then we ask: can we appropriately implement this
policy guideline to make such distinctions regarding the web, where AI
systems now routinely provide coarse translations of copyrighted material,
to the general public? In this sense, we argue that the pervasive
inaccuracies of AI translation should inform any discussion about
balancing access to knowledge with the rights of authors in the copyright
regime. If AI translation cannot be consistently relied upon for formulaic
texts, then when it is used for more colloquial and colorful works, the
underlying copyright violation becomes even more pertinent because a
poor quality translation may violate an author’s moral rights in places
where these are legally recognized.73 Yet web users rely on AI translation
for all sorts of material, and this issue gets scant attention.
Another related problem relates to the biases inherently embedded in
AI systems in general.74 This issue is crucial when we discuss AI
translation systems’ lack of linguistic understanding. Professionals in a
wide range of industries have greeted the arrival of AI systems
enthusiastically, focusing on their efficiency and ability to process vast
troves of data.75 AI systems are now involved in hiring and firing, granting
loans, evaluating tenants, and deciding which airline passengers should be
on the No Fly List.76 Yet, despite their usefulness, AI systems can also
73. “The non-economic interests of authors are found worthy of protection because of the
presumed intimate bond between authors and their works, which are almost universally understood to
be an extension of the author’s personhood. The standard set of moral rights recognized in the literature
consists of the author’s right to claim authorship (right of attribution), the right to object to
modifications of the work (right of integrity), the right to decide when and how the work in question
will be published (right of disclosure), and the right to withdraw a work after publication (right of
withdrawal).” Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 355–56
(2006).
74. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Sean Hallisey, “Equality and Privacy by Design”: A New Model
of Artificial Intelligence Data Transparency via Auditing, Certification, and Safe Harbor Regimes, 46
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 428 (2019) (describing many types of biases in AI systems).
75. “Generally, big data analytics focuses on examining large data sets to gather useful
information to help organizations make more-informed business decisions. Businesses are capitalizing
on this newfound ability by overhauling the ways in which they source and evaluate candidates,
analyze attrition risks, optimize individual and team performance, identify safety risks, provide
wellness guidance and resources, and much more.” Nathaniel M. Glasser et al., Big Data, People
Analytics and Employment Decisions: The Rewards and Often-Overlooked Risks, WESTLAW J. EMP.,
Mar. 27, 2018, at 1.
76. See Yanisky-Ravid & Hallisey, supra note 74 (noting that data can be illegal, discriminatory,
manufactured, unreliable, or simply incomplete, and that the more data AI systems “swallow,” the
greater the likelihood they will contribute to biased, discriminatory decisions or could violate privacy.
The article discusses how discrimination can arise, even inadvertently, from the operation of “trusted”
and “objective” AI systems, and advocates for increased transparency); see also Danielle Keats Citron,
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1297 (2008); Joshua A. Kroll et al.,
Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 636 (2017) (“The tools currently available to
policymakers, legislators, and courts were developed to oversee human decisionmakers and often fail
when applied to computers instead. For example, how do you judge the intent of a piece of software?
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generate biased results that violate fundamental rights or, at the very least,
flout social norms.77 Safiya Umoja Noble, for example, has highlighted
the sexist and racist failures of algorithmic data.78 Privacy scholar Danielle
Keats Citron has argued that automated systems’ lack of notice and
transparency jeopardizes due process norms and further, that
“[a]utomation encourages agencies to adopt overly simplified policy,
which can more easily be translated into code.”79 In the translation context,
while Turkish uses the same pronoun, “o” for he and she, until recently,
when Google Translate was asked to translate “o bir doctor” (he or she is
a doctor) into English, it defaulted to the masculine “he is a doctor.”80
We do not pretend that human translators are free of biases; any
choice of words reflects personal perspective and experience. However,
human translators do understand the meaning of the words before them
and are capable of making nuanced distinctions. The now pervasive
presence of AI translation services, their reliance on opaque data, and the
influence of automation bias—that is, the global populace’s general trust
of algorithmic results—all suggest that our enthusiasm for these products
should not blind us to their weaknesses.81
Because automated decision systems can return potentially incorrect, unjustified, or unfair results,
additional approaches are needed to make such systems accountable and governable.”).
77. See Kroll et al., supra note 76, at 636; see also Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, Code
Dependent: Pros and Cons of the Algorithm Age, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 8, 2017),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/02/08/code-dependent-pros-and-cons-of-the-algorithm-age
[https://perma.cc/4JVK-NY4Z].
78. SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE
RACISM 4 (2018) (arguing that search algorithms produce racist results because they reflect the biases
of the people who develop them).
79. See Citron, supra note 76, at 1297.
80. See Li Zhou, Is Your Software Racist?, POLITICO (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.politico.
com/agenda/story/2018/02/07/algorithmic-bias-software-recommendations-000631 [https://perma.
cc/B93E-JK4K].
Google’s Translate tool “learns” language from an existing corpus of writing, and the
writing often includes cultural patterns regarding how men and women are described.
Because the model is trained on data that already has biases of its own, the results that it
spits out serve only to further replicate and even amplify them. It might seem strange that
a seemingly objective piece of software would yield gender-biased results, but the problem
is an increasing concern in the technology world . . . Voice-based assistants, like Amazon’s
Alexa, have struggled to recognize different accents. A Microsoft chatbot on Twitter
started spewing racist posts after learning from other users on the platform. In a particularly
embarrassing example in 2015, a black computer programmer found that Google’s photorecognition tool labeled him and a friend as “gorillas.”
Id. For further discussion of this issue, see James Zou & Londa Schiebinger, AI Can Be Sexist and
Racist—It’s Time to Make it Fair, 559 NATURE INT’L J. SCI. 324 (July 12, 2018).
81. See Citron, supra note 76, at 1271–72 (“[H]uman beings rely on automated decisions even
when they suspect system malfunction. The impulse to follow a computer’s recommendation flows
from human ‘automation bias’—the ‘use of automation as a heuristic replacement for vigilant
information seeking and processing.’ Automation bias effectively turns a computer program’s
suggested answer into a trusted final decision.”).
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E. Translation and Copyright Protection
The right of authors to original and derivative copyrights in their
works is guaranteed internationally. For example, the Berne International
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne
Convention) defines translation as a protected derivative work that authors
own and control.82 The United States Copyright Act of 1976 also
recognizes translation as a derivative work, in which the author holds
exclusive rights.83 Copyright’s legal protections even extend to intangible
goods presented to the public, and there is no exception for the internet:
copyright law protects works even when they are accessible to all in
cyberspace, and even when they can be easily downloaded and copied.84
No registration or special display symbol is necessary; once fixed in “any
tangible medium of expression,”85 authors have automatic copyright
protection for their original creative works.86 In other words, the mere fact
that copyrighted works exist online in an easy-to-access format does not
mean they are not protected or that they have become public domain.
When authors’ works appear on the web, they serve as a constant
source of free material for large, for-profit entities such as Google and
Microsoft, who make significant financial gain from their translation—
precisely the type of exploitation that copyright law seeks to prevent.
Because the internet is global, by examining the theoretical justifications
for copyright law and the relevant legal norms in four countries—the
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France—this Article
brings a wider comparative and global view of copyright protection in the
3A era. First, however, we address the evolution of AI systems in general
and of AI translation systems specifically.

82. “Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall enjoy the exclusive
right of making and of authorizing the translation of their works throughout the term of protection of
their rights in the original works.” Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
art. 8, Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
83. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original
work of authorship, is a “derivative work.”
Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2018).
84. See generally Robin Andrews, Note, Copyright Infringement and the Internet: An Economic
Analysis of Crime, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 256 (2005).
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
86. “[R]egistration is not a condition of copyright protection.” 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2018).
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AI TRANSLATION SYSTEMS
Though definitions of AI vary, AI systems are generally understood
as human-like systems that can perform complex tasks involving decisionmaking, creativity, learning, development, and communication—systems
that usually require human intelligence.87 Such systems are presently used
in a variety of fields, from diagnostic medicine and automated weaponry
to intelligence gathering, and from the world of art and inventions to that
of contract drafting.88
A. Artificial Intelligence (AI) Systems: What, When, How
As computers grew in popularity throughout the 1940s and became
commercially available, their brain-like attributes caught the popular
imagination.89 In 1946, the press described the Electronic Numerical
Integrator and Computer (ENIAC) as a “giant brain,” and, thereafter,
computers regularly outperformed humans in mathematical exercises and
games such as chess.
In his well-known article Computing Machinery and Intelligence,
computer scientist and mathematician Alan Turing considered the ability
of machines to think, observing that “[i]ntelligent behaviour presumably
consists in a departure from the completely disciplined behaviour involved
in computation, but a rather slight one, which does not give rise to random
behaviour, or to pointless repetitive loops.”90 Nearly seventy years later,
technological advances have brought AI programs increasingly into the
public awareness, yet even experts in the field struggle to agree on a
precise definition for AI, largely because intelligence is an ambiguous
concept even for humans.91 Today, instead of emphasizing machines’
abilities to perform tasks, AI definitions tend to “focus on the concept of
machines that work to achieve goals.”92

87. See Person, supra note 7; see also Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 7.
88. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Luis Antonio Velez-Hernandez, Copyrightability of Artworks
Produced by Creative Robots and Originality: The Formality-Objective Model, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 1, 4–6 (2018).
89. RAY KURZWEIL, HOW TO CREATE A MIND: THE SECRET OF HUMAN THOUGHT REVEALED
180 (2013) (“When computers first became a popular topic in the 1940s, they were immediately
regarded as thinking machines. The ENIAC, which was announced in 1946, was described in the press
as a ‘giant brain.’ As computers became commercially available in the following decade, ads routinely
referred to them as brains capable of feats that ordinary biological brains could not match.”).
90. A. M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 49 MIND 433, 459 (1950).
91. See Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges,
Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 359 (2016) (“The difficulty in defining
artificial intelligence lies not in the concept of artificiality but rather in the conceptual ambiguity of
intelligence.”).
92. Id. at 361.
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AI systems can be described as those “capable of performing tasks
that would normally require human intelligence, [evidenced by]
recognition, decision-making, creation, learning, evolving, and
communicating,” or that allow humans to reach their goals more
efficiently by processing data.93 While early AI “expert systems” ran by
applying rules input by humans, today AI systems function via “neural
networks” that imitate human brain functions by analyzing patterns within
the data they process and learning through trial and error.94 For example,
in 2003, Raymond Kurzweil patented his Cybernetic Poet, a program
which analyzes poems written by human authors, creates a word-sequence
model, and generates new, original verse in the same style.95 The Next
Rembrandt project sought to expose a computer to as many digital copies
of Rembrandt’s works as possible in order to teach it not only to replicate
those paintings, but also to generate new ones with a similar look without
any further input from the software developers and art historians.96 Famed
auction house Christie’s sold its first piece of AI-generated portraiture for
$432,500.97 Nowadays, AI systems also produce music and many other
sorts of creative works.98

93. Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 7, at 673.
94. Id. at 675.
95. Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 36.
Raymond Kurzweil was granted United States Patent No. 6,647,395 for
[his] . . . Cybernetic Poet, [which] is designed to be used either as a “poet’s assistant” or as
an automatic poetry generator. The program is “provided with an input file of poems
written by a human author or authors. It analyzes these poems and creates a word-sequence
model based on the poems it has just read. It then writes original stanzas of poetry using
the model it has created.” The resulting stanzas, according to the patent’s written
description, “will have a similar style to the poem(s) originally analyzed and contained in
the author analysis model, but will be original poetry generated by the process.”
Id.
96. See Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 7, at 663–64 (describing the AIproduced Rembrandt Project and the questions of ownership and accountability it raises).
97. The work sold for nearly forty-five times its high estimate. See Is Artificial Intelligence Set
to Become Art’s Next Medium?, CHRISTIE’S (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.christies.com/features/Acollaboration-between-two-artists-one-human-one-a-machine-9332-1.aspx [https://perma.cc/TZ4JLB7X] (noting that the AI system produced the work after algorithmic exposure to 15,000 others); see
also Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 7.
98. For a demonstration of jazz music produced by an AI system, see AI and Intellectual
Property Law Featuring Prof. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
PODCAST (May 4, 2018), http://www.fordhamiplj.org/2018/05/04/episode-51-ai-and-intellectualproperty-law [https://perma.cc/DYW2-XSEY] (featuring audio of a jazz composition generated by an
AI system at the 14:05 mark); see also, e.g., Dani Deahl, How AI-Generated Music is Changing the
Way Hits are Made, VERGE (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/31/17777008/
artificial-intelligence-taryn-southern-amper-music [https://perma.cc/PK9D-HXC7] (noting that
“music-making AI software has advanced so far in the past few years that it’s no longer a frightening
novelty; it’s a viable tool that can and is being used by producers to help in the creative process”).
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The publishing industry is also experimenting with AI uses in
journalism; a Los Angeles Times journalist developed an algorithm called
Quakebot, which produces simplistic news stories based on United States
Geological Survey reports, and companies such as Narrative Science and
Automated Insights have also experimented with AI uses for the news
business.99 Though AI news stories still remain on the fringes of the news
market and do not always sound quite right to readers, interest in the
potential applications for the evolving technology still remains high.100
Despite the overwhelming enthusiasm for AI systems, some
commentators have raised concerns about the ways in which they produce
biased results and may perpetuate undesirable forms of discrimination by
relying on unrepresentative data sets.101
B. AI Translation Systems
AI translation systems are computer systems which can translate
content with or without human assistance; they are not translation tools,
such as online dictionaries or terminology forums.102 The systems may be
designed to be bilingual or multilingual, unidirectional or bidirectional.103
The oldest type of translation system functions with a “direct translation”
approach: designed for a specific pairing of languages, it operates by
moving from the source language unidirectionally to a target language

99. JAQUES BUGHIN ET AL., 2017 MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE
NEXT DIGITAL FRONTIER?, at iv (2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/
industries/advanced%20electronics/our%20Insights/How%20artificial%20intelligence%20can%20d
eliver%20real%20value%20to%20companies/MGI-Artificial-Intelligence-Discussion-paper.ashx
[https://perma.cc/7PD6-G62D].
Artificial intelligence is poised to unleash the next wave of digital disruption, and
companies should prepare for it now . . . . AI investment is growing fast, dominated by
digital giants such as Google and Baidu. Globally, we estimate tech giants spent $20 billion
to $30 billion on AI in 2016, with 90 percent of this spent on R&D and
deployment . . . early AI adopters that combine strong digital capability with proactive
strategies have higher profit margins and expect the performance gap with other firms to
widen in the future . . . . Early adopters are already creating competitive advantages, and
the gap with the laggards looks set to grow.
Id.; see also Robert C. Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for Computer-Generated Works,
69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 251, 257 (2016) (“Whatever the future holds, artificial intelligence is already
an active participant in the creative process.”).
100. Denicola, supra note 99, at 261. See generally Lin Weeks, Note, Media Law and Copyright
Implications of Automated Journalism, 4 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 67 (2014) (describing
uses of AI in journalism).
101. See generally Michele Willson, Algorithms (and the) Everyday, 20 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y
137 (2016).
102. See generally W. John Hutchins, Machine Translation: A Brief History, in CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE LANGUAGE SCIENCES: FROM THE SUMERIANS TO THE COGNITIVISTS 431–45 (Ernst
F. K. Koerner & Ronald E. Asher eds., 1995).
103. Id.

2019]

From the Myth of Babel

123

using certain rules.104 An example of a programming rule might specify
that the English “you” can be either “vous” or “tu” in French.105 A second
type of translation system, known as “interlingua,” relies on two stages of
translation: first, from a source language into an intermediate
“interlingua,” and then, from the interlingua into the target language.106
This type of system may rely on an artificial, or auxiliary, language as a
cushion between the source and target languages.107 It digitally identifies
patterns and similarities among all languages and then creates a new
language that synthesizes all common structures before translating the data
to the target language. A third type of translation system follows a transfer
approach: converting source language texts into abstract representations,
then converting into the target language equivalent representations, and
finally, into the target language text.108 In each of these methods, the AI
system relies on a constant input of new data, meaning that the data
provider or machine “trainer” are a vital part of the system’s functioning.
The first automated translation systems began to appear in the 1930s
and gradually improved throughout the remaining decades of the twentieth
century, particularly in the United States, Soviet Union, Japan, and
Europe.109 Commercial interest in translation gained momentum
throughout the 1990s alongside the rise of the internet.110
Today, AI translation systems are everywhere: on mobile phones,
computers, virtual assistants, and many other devices.111 Business use of
online, simultaneous translation continues to expand as the available
systems improve. Users, in fact, play an active role in the development of
AI translation tools by providing feedback and language corrections.112
The following discussion will focus on this unique role of users around the
globe, and their important contribution to the development of AI
translation systems, which evolve with every additional piece of data.
C. Users as Data and Feedback Providers
A unique and interesting feature of AI online translation systems is
the involvement and contribution of the users in improving and
programming them. AI systems function thanks to an array of
stakeholders, which one of this Article’s authors, Dr. Yanisky-Ravid, has
104. Id.
105. Ketzan, supra note 47, at 212.
106. Hutchins, supra note 102.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also Ketzan, supra note 47, at 209.
110. See Ketzan, supra note 47, at 210.
111. See Gershgorn, supra note 9.
112. See infra Part III.
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referred to as “the multi-player model.”113 The players in this model
include software developers, data suppliers, trainers who provide
feedback, owners and operators, manufacturers and even, possibly, the
state and insurance companies.114 Because these systems rely on large
volumes of data, data providers perform a vital role in the development of
any AI system.115 Likewise, AI translation systems depend on receiving a
massive amount of data and feedback in all languages, without which they
cannot function properly.116 To meet this need, AI translation is
remarkable in its reliance on crowd wisdom.117 In other words, by using
AI translation systems, we all become players, improving them by
providing data and feedback. Thus, we not only use and enjoy the systems,
we also refine their abilities. Google Translate, for one, has encouraged its
users around the world to be data providers and AI trainers, who correct
the system and help fine-tune its translations, thus transforming users into
an integral part of the multi-player model.118 The boundaries between
users and system developers blur in never-ending, evolving cycles of
machine learning and improving. The significant contributions of AI
translation program users might, however, have legal consequences from
a copyright perspective.119
In some respects, Google Translate and similar programs mirror the
work of human translators. The machines look at a sentence and must
decide on a likely appropriate equivalent in the target language based on
data previously encountered from users.120 Moreover, AI systems’ ability
to process vast amounts of data at a high volume in some contexts makes
them more efficient than human translators.121 AI translation tools rely on
a translation memory, “a database that stores previously translated
segments,” and before they translate a file of segments, they analyze how
113. See Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 7, at 691–93 (discussing questions
of ownership and accountability for works produced by AI systems); see also Yanisky-Ravid & Liu,
supra note 7, at 2231–36 (suggesting that the involvement of multiple stakeholders in inventions
created by AI systems disrupts the traditional patent process because there is no single inventor).
114. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 7, at 2232–33.
115. Yanisky-Ravid & Hallisey, supra note 72 (focusing on data as the main source of bias in
algorithmic results).
116. Id.
117. For a discussion of crowd wisdom, see, e.g., Ralph Hertwig, Tapping Into the Wisdom of
the Crowd—With Confidence, 336 SCI. 303, 303–04 (2012).
118. See GOOGLE TRANSLATE COMMUNITY, https://translate.google.com/community [https://
perma/cc/UW2C-Y7G4].
119. See infra Part IV (examining AI translations according to the derivative works doctrine).
120. See, e.g., Andy Way, A Critique of Statistical Machine Translation, in LINGUISTICA
ANTVERPIENSIA, NEW SERIES-THEMES IN TRANSLATION STUDIES 17, 25 (2009) (“In a nutshell, the
goal of PB-SMT is to find the most likely translation T of a source sentence S. We say ‘most likely,’
as many possible candidate target language translations may be proposed by the system.”).
121. Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 7.
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many translated segments are available for reuse.122 Similarly, a human
translator must read a sentence and draw on previous experience and
knowledge of the target language to propose a translation that sounds as
smooth and similar to the original as possible.123
Nevertheless, the question of whether AI online translation systems
can ever truly replace the work of human translators remains open. Word
meanings are context-dependent, and people who speak several languages
have a nuanced cultural understanding of written expression that eludes
even the most high-level machines.124 AI translation systems—unlike
human beings—plug in their solutions based on data input, following what
might be described as the “Chinese Room” method, meaning that a correct
output can result without knowing whether the machine understands the
meaning as humans do (or think they do).125 By contrast, human translators
actually understand thoughts, emotions, and the words they read, and can,
therefore, better grapple with ambiguities and have a higher potential for
accuracy.126
In an article comparing accuracy assessments for machine translation
with similar assessments for human translators, linguists and researchers
Marina Fomicheva and Lucia Specia described a conceptual flaw: machine
translations are usually evaluated in comparison to a human translation,
instead of to their original source text—which is the standard method for
reviewing human translations.127 Implicit in this approach is the
122. Christophe Eyraud, Case Study: Cutting 15% of Translation Costs with Artificial
Intelligence, MEMSOURCE (May 29, 2018), https://www.memsource.com/blog/2018/05/29/casestudy-cutting-15-of-translation-costs-with-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/W3Y5-Z4GZ].
123. See, e.g., Lawrence Venuti, The Translator’s Invisibility, 28 CRITICISM 179, 179 (1986)
(arguing that people commonly feel that “the more ‘successful’ the translation, the more invisible the
translator, and the more visible the author or meaning of the original text”).
124. See EUGENE A. NIDA, CONTEXTS IN TRANSLATING 11 (2001) (“[A] language is always part
of a culture and the meaning of any text refers directly or indirectly to the corresponding culture.”).
125. See Turing, supra note 90, at 460. Turing proposed that a human have separate
conversations on a screen with a machine and with another person, and then guess which was which;
if the human could not reliably identify the machine, the machine was said to have passed the test. Id.
But cf. John Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs, 3 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 417 (1980). In this famous
paper about the “Chinese Room,” Searle argued that machines can massive amounts of data without
understanding and without thinking, and therefore the “Turing Test” cannot be used to conclude that
a machine can think. Id. For a discussion of the Personhood and Consciousness Approach to AI
Systems, see Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 7, at 684–85 (describing the notion
that perception works the same way for humans and AI systems).
126. Nevertheless, human translators can make mistakes, too. See, e.g., KORCHILOV, supra note
35, at 20 (describing a mistake by an interpreter at a major international conference, who caused
considerable upset between Soviet and Danish delegates after he mistranslated a Russian saying that
literally means “an elderberry grows in the kitchen and my uncle lives in Kiev” and figuratively means
“mixing apples and oranges,” into “something is rotten in the kingdom of Denmark”).
127. Marina Fomicheva & Lucia Specia, Reference Bias in Monolingual Machine Translation
Evaluation, 2 54TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASS’N FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE 77, 77–82 (2016).
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assumption “that the task of translation has a single correct solution,”
when in fact, “except for very short sentences or very specific technical
domains, the same source sentence may be correctly translated in many
different ways.”128 Thus, even in the way it is assessed, AI translation lags
behind the richness and greater accuracy of human translation.
In sum, AI online translation systems have many advantages.
Compared to human translators, they are faster, more instantly accessible,
cheaper, and convenient in that they operate in almost every language.
However, even though human translation has never been perfect, AI online
translation systems lack some significant human abilities and therefore
present major drawbacks, limitations, and new challenges, all of which
will be discuss in the following subsection.
D. The Limitations of AI Translation
Throughout history, translations have been both an important
communication tool and a source of tension.129 In his book, Through the
Language Glass, Israeli linguist Guy Deutscher muses over the following
questions: “[i]s [language] an artifact of culture or a bequest of nature? If
we hold language up as a mirror to the mind, what do we see reflected
there: human nature or the cultural conventions of our society?”130 One
might ask related questions of translations: how closely do they capture
the cultural ideas and imagery expressed in the original works they are
based on? Must they be done by humans to properly convey meaning, or
are machines just as capable of reflecting nuanced ideas?
Over the past several decades, there has been an increase in the global
use of online translation services. AI translation systems go far beyond
Google’s famous translation tool, encompassing a variety of services. Not
only can web users read content translated into multiple languages by
pasting text into a box or by asking the service to translate an entire web
page, but they can also access lectures, movies, songs, and books—which
are just as easily translated into any widely spoken language—in a single
click.131 Many AI web translation services are freely accessible, while
some are only available to software brand customers.132 Yet, because AI
translation services rely on data and statistics rather than personal
understanding, they cannot replicate all the nuances of human languages,
idioms, and colloquial expressions, so AI-translated results are often a
128. Id. at 77.
129. See generally FREEDMAN, supra note 25.
130. GUY DEUTSCHER, THROUGH THE LANGUAGE GLASS: WHY THE WORLD LOOKS DIFFERENT
IN OTHER LANGUAGES 9 (2010).
131. See generally Ketzan, supra note 47.
132. Machine Translation, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/translator/mt.aspx
[https://perma/cc/E7HG-RMSF].
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distorted reflection of original works. For example, AI translations of web
pages are frequently rough and inaccurate, while AI translations of
copyrightable books or papers contain many mistakes.133 We argue that,
given the polemics that have so often surrounded translations throughout
history, future copyright disputes over the unauthorized linguistic efforts
of machines are inevitable.
AI translation relies on technology to convert text from one language
into another by continuously collecting linguistic data and sorting it,
creating new and more accurate patterns with each additional piece of
data.134 Although AI translations have greatly improved over the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries, significant differences in quality and accuracy
between machine and human translations still remain. While these
differences might diminish over time, they are unlikely to completely
disappear, especially as some languages have been translated more than
others, leading to differences in the availability of training data for
machines.135 In short, AI translations remain unsophisticated compared to
those produced by people.136 This inherent drawback raises questions
about appropriate uses of translation and how such uses may affect the
market for authors’, as well as human translators’, copyrighted works.
In some contexts, the rough-around-the-edges nature of AI
translations poses no great problem, as the stakes are low and, therefore,
less harmful. In such contexts, once the threats of AI translation have been
acknowledged, these systems can be efficiently used. Reading a street sign
or menu, driving with a taxi driver who does not understand your
language, or asking for directions in a foreign country, all present
examples of how AI translation is poised to efficiently facilitate
communication, as compared to alternative, more threatening scenes. The
internet is replete with gems such as “Take Luggage of Foreigner, No
Charge.”137 If one’s goal is merely to broadly comprehend the subject
133. See Ketzan, supra note 47, at 224 (noting that machine translation, “even excellent . . . has
little to offer the fully bilingual human translator. The reason is that MT has a ‘tin ear,’ so to speak”).
134. See Yates, supra note 58, at 484.
135. See VR Ferose, Barney Pell & Lorien Pratt, From the Business of Language to the
Language of Business: The Future of Translation Worldwide, DIGITALIST MAG. (May 17, 2018),
https://www.digitalistmag.com/machine-learning-ai/2018/05/17/future-of-translation-worldwide06168565 [https://perma.cc/8EFK-R9DE] (“These less-translated languages have less training data,
making the automation problem harder . . . .”).
136. See Ian Henderson, Chasing the Unicorn of Auto-Translation: Why Automation Tools Can’t
Work for Businesses, WIRED (Aug. 2014), https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/08/chasing-unicornauto-translation-automation-tools-cant-work-businesses [https://perma.cc/D9UW-EJZ3] (noting that
“‘language’ is far more than just words” and that “[f]or machines to accurately translate, there needs
to be as much abstract thinking as mathematical calculations”).
137. Chungcharn Or, Lost in Translation: Our Top 20 Picks, LONELY PLANET (Nov. 24, 2011),
https://www.lonelyplanet.com/blog/2011/11/24/lost-in-translation-our-top-20-photos [https://perma.
cc/C8ZU-EM9L].

128

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:99

matter of a text, then AI translation works quite well. The European Patent
Office (EPO) has even partnered with Google Translate to create an
automated translation service for public patent documents.138 In this
instance, the stated goal is to provide people with the ability to skim
documents in various languages for a basic understanding of their
content.139 “The machine translation system should give you the gist of
any patent or patent-related document, and help you to determine whether
it is relevant. You might decide on this basis whether you need to invest
in a human translation of the document,” the EPO advises, adding: “Please
note that the engine cannot provide legally binding translations.”140 In
other words, as long as “the gist” of meaning suffices, AI translation can
provide a valuable service and facilitate efficient research. In Found in
Translation: How Language Shapes Our Lives and Transforms the World,
authors Nataly Kelly and Jost Zetzsche came to the same conclusion,
noting, “[F]or some projects, companies just want an approximate
translation—they don’t care if the clothes fit properly, so long as they can
be worn . . . . Automated translation does have its place, especially in
certain industries.”141
Problems arise, however, when the quality and accuracy of a
translation are more important. In the medical field, where doctor-patient
communication is vital to the provision of care, errors in automated
translation can have serious consequences.142 United States judges have
held that Google-translated documents do not satisfy the proper
authentication requirements for extradition under 18 U.S.C. § 3190143 and
have expressed strong skepticism of the accuracy of AI translation.144
Linguist David Bellos observed that “you should never use [Google
138. Patent Translate, EUR. PATENT OFF., http://www.epo.org/searching-for-patents/helpfulresources/patent-translate.html#tab3 [https://perma.cc/J9RZ-XS53].
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. NATALY KELLY & JOST ZETZSCHE, FOUND IN TRANSLATION: HOW LANGUAGE SHAPES
OUR LIVES AND TRANSFORMS THE WORLD 219 (2012).
142. For a discussion of the pros and cons of using AI translation systems in the medical field,
see Rachel M. Taylor, Nicola Crichton, Beki Moult & Faith Gibson, A Prospective Observational
Study of Machine Translation Software to Overcome the Challenge of Including Ethnic Diversity in
Healthcare Research, 2 NURSING OPEN 14 (2015).
143. See, e.g., In re Extradition of Ferriolo, 126 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2015)
(holding that an internet search engine’s English translations of Italian criminal statutes were
inadmissible in court).
144. Martinez v. United States, 828 F.3d 451, 483 (6th Cir. 2016) (Clay, J., dissenting) (“The
majority’s argument is less than persuasive when one realizes that its legal argument is predicated on
a popularized and less than precise translation source. Language is complex and the meaning of a word
can vary greatly depending on its context, as any native speaker can attest. It would seem that the
majority is defining various phrases in a vacuum without considering the appropriate contexts in which
they were used.”).
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Translate] to translate into a language you do not know very well. Use it
only to translate into a language in which you are sure you can recognize
nonsense.”145
Ultimately, who should be responsible for the results of AI
translation? How concerned should we be about the biases these results
may contain? Who owns these new works? Who should benefit from
them? These questions will be discussed first according to the traditional,
derivative works approach, then through an examination of theoretical
justifications for intellectual property law and, finally, according to the
new model we propose in this study.
E. The Hidden Biases of AI Translation Systems and Their Undesirable
Results
Like other AI systems, AI translation systems offer great benefits—
for instance, facilitating communication when perfect accuracy is not
required—however, they also pose challenges related to their inability to
perceive or understand nuance, as well as to the bias in their algorithms.146
Thus, some of the same risks associated with AI systems in the
employment or financial sectors also apply to online translation services.
Because large firms dominate the AI sector, AI translation systems’ results
may reflect the biases of these companies, or of society at large, if users
provide feedback, as they can for Google Translate.147 If training data is
flawed, discriminatory outcomes can occur, perpetuating society’s
discriminatory attitudes.
In an article entitled Accountable Algorithms, the authors discuss the
lack of accountability mechanisms in place for software that makes
decisions that formerly would have been made by individuals, arguing that
the law has lagged behind as technology has leapfrogged ahead.148 In
addition to advocating for greater collaboration between lawmakers and
computer scientists, the authors highlight some of the problems that can
emerge when algorithmic bias goes unchecked, noting that “[a] significant
concern about automated decisionmaking is that it may simultaneously
systematize and conceal discrimination,” and further, that “decisions made
by computers may enjoy an undeserved assumption of fairness or

145. See BELLOS, supra note 23, at 256.
146. See, e.g., Willson, supra note 101, at 9 (“[T]he outcomes point to the lack of nuance or
contextual understanding that such processes often do not accommodate, and the impact they may
have when being addressed to complex, socially embedded human users and systems. They are also
not open to outside scrutiny that might enable underpinning assumptions to be interrogated: it is only
their products or outputs that can be addressed.”).
147. See supra note 118.
148. See generally Kroll et al., supra note 76.
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objectivity.”149 For example, a program designed to select the best
applicants for a job may be trained using information about candidates a
company has previously hired; if those candidates were predominantly
male—not because they were better-qualified but because the former
human resources director was sexist—then the algorithm will simply
perpetuate the original bias, favoring male applicants over similarly
qualified female applicants.150 Even when no malice is involved, an
algorithm’s distorted analysis of statistics can lead to unfair results, for
instance, by directing police officers to stop and frisk members of certain
groups because, historically, those groups have “been the target of
disproportionate enforcement.”151
Although many scholars see the software as the main source of
biases,152 a recent study suggested that the data, rather than the software,
played a much more important role in creating and spreading biases.153
According to this view, exposing AI systems to more data does not
necessarily eliminate biases because society itself is biased, and the data
therefore reflects sexism, racism, and a myriad of other social biases.
Writing in Nature, an international journal of science, James Zou and
Londa Schiebinger describe Google Translate converting Spanish news
articles into English, transforming “she said” into “he said,” and a Nikon
camera software perceiving Asians as always blinking.154 They argue that:
A major driver of bias in AI is the training data. Most machinelearning tasks are trained on large, annotated data sets . . . [i]n naturallanguage processing, standard algorithms are trained on corpora
consisting of billions of words. Researchers typically construct such
data sets by scraping websites, such as Google Images and Google
News, using specific query terms, or by aggregating easy-to-access
information from sources such as Wikipedia. These data sets are then
annotated, often by graduate students or through crowdsourcing
platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. Such methods can
unintentionally produce data that encode gender, ethnic and cultural
biases. Frequently, some groups are over-represented and others are
under-represented.155

149. Id. at 680.
150. Id. at 681.
151. Id.
152. Id. See generally Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property
in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018) (arguing in favor of revealing algorithms
in criminal trials, even when they involve trade secrets).
153. Yanisky-Ravid & Hallisey, supra note 74 (arguing that data, rather than software, is the
main cause for the perpetuation of social biases and rights violations by AI systems).
154. Zou & Schiebinger, supra note 80.
155. Id.
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Because faulty algorithms can magnify biases through feedback
loops, Zou and Schiebinger note that each time a program such as Google
Translate defaults to a masculine pronoun, it increases that pronoun’s
relative frequency on the web, “potentially reversing hard-won advances
towards equity.”156
Though linguist Bellos humorously advised Google Translate users
to steer clear of the program unless they were familiar enough with their
target language to recognize “nonsense,”157 the same users should also be
on the lookout for bias. Many of those consulting AI translation services
are, nonetheless, wholly unfamiliar with the languages for which they are
seeking assistance and are, consequently, oblivious to any offense they
may cause. We argue that when AI online translation systems switch male
and female pronouns or use racist expressions, they are accurately
mirroring social prejudices; however, instead of simply accepting and
parroting back these prejudices, we would like to see the systems taking a
more progressive linguistic stance. Previously, Yanisky-Ravid has argued
that, when necessary, AI systems should disclose the data they rely on, and
that an auditing and certification program for algorithms would incentivize
industry to implement non-discriminatory best practices. Google is
reportedly working to address its bias problems by offering both masculine
and feminine translation options when both are appropriate, but so far, the
improvements are limited. They are partially available, for example, only
“when translating English into French, Italian, Portuguese or Spanish and
when translating from Turkish to English.”158 How effective Google’s
updates will be across its entire language repertoire remains to be seen.
Regardless, the problem is that when users rely on AI online
translation systems to convert a known language into an unknown one,
they have no way of assessing the results and any biases remain concealed.
These hidden biases are not the only problem with AI online translation
systems.
IV. TRANSLATION AND COPYRIGHT LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Translations undoubtedly require creativity, but are they best
understood as original or derivative works? The legal doctrine surrounding
translations has changed over time, highlighting some of the tensions
present in the current copyright issues of AI-generated translations. Here,
we examine these questions more closely and conclude that if translations
156. Id.
157. BELLOS, supra note 23, at 256.
158. Mallory Locklear, Google Is Working to Remove Gender Bias in Its Translations,
ENGADGET (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/12/07/google-remove-gender-biastranslations [https://perma.cc/2UKT-YX7J].
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continue to be classified as derivative works, a new legal and digital
framework is needed to facilitate the use of AI translation systems while
respecting the balancing goals of copyright law.
A. The Past: Translation as a New Creative Work
Authors have not always had the right to control the production of
derivative works based on their original creations: in early copyright
disputes, courts held that translating books without an author’s
authorization was not infringement.159 For many years, judges perceived
translations, abridgements, and improvements “as intellectual products of
the second comers’ creativity” and believed that such new works
“contributed to the advancement of knowledge—the very goal of modern
copyright law.”160
In the UK, some believed that a translation of a book fell outside the
scope of the 1710 Statute of Anne, which provided for court enforcement
of copyright law.161 In a famous English case, Burnett v. Chetwood, the
Lord Chancellor agreed with the defendants, who stood accused of
producing an unauthorized translation of a copyrighted book, that the
statute “could be intended only to restrain the mechanical art of printing,
and that others should not pirate the copy and gain an advantage to
themselves by reprinting it” and should not apply to a translation of the
book, “which in some respects may be called a different book, and the
translator may be said to be the author, in as much as some skill in
language is requisite thereto, and not barely a mechanic art, as in the case
of reprinting in the same language.”162 In other words, because translation
requires great skill and does not involve rote copying, it is better viewed
as original work and thus the translation of a copyrighted work should not
require the permission of the original author.
Similarly, in the American case Stowe v. Thomas, the author Harriet
Beecher Stowe sued a man for translating her copyrighted work, Uncle
Tom’s Cabin, into German and publishing it in chapters in a Philadelphia
newspaper, Die Freie Presse.163 She had already hired and compensated a
different translator, and the authorized translation was published and
copyrighted.164 The court held that the unauthorized translation did not
159. See Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative Work
Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 1505 (2013) (referencing Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1853) (No. 13,514) and Burnett v. Chetwood, 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch. 1720)).
160. Samuelson, supra note 159, at 1507.
161. Copyright Act of 1710 (Statute of Anne), 8 Ann. c. 21 (Gr. Brit.); see also Burnett, 35 Eng.
Rep. 1008.
162. Burnett, 35 Eng. Rep. 1008.
163. Stowe, 23 F. Cas. 201.
164. Id.

2019]

From the Myth of Babel

133

violate Stowe’s rights as an author because it was not a copy, but rather an
inventive work that borrowed her ideas, which were not subject to
copyright:
[t]o make a good translation of a work, often requires more learning,
talent and judgment, than was required to write the original. Many
can transfer from one language to another, but few can translate. To
call the translations of an author’s ideas and conceptions into another
language, a copy of his book, would be an abuse of terms, and
arbitrary judicial legislation.165

Nevertheless, in 1870 the United States Congress amended copyright
law, providing authors with more control over the translation of their
works, and in 1909, it established a careful list of derivatives that authors
were allowed to manage.166 There was a sense that unauthorized
translations unjustly enriched the infringer and hurt demand for the
original work, even if unauthorized translations were most likely “to
supplant demand for authorized derivatives than to supplant demand for
the original.”167 Since a proliferation of bootleg translations would
undermine authors’ discretion in choosing how to render their original
works in new markets, the law was changed to grant authors greater
control over translations of their works.168
In Shook v. Rankin, an 1875 case from the Northern District of
Illinois, complainants were the owners of an original, unpublished French
manuscript that had been translated into English by a man named Jackson
with the consent of the original authors.169 Defendants were performers
who had acted out Jackson’s translation at a Chicago theater without his
permission.170 They denied that Jackson had acquired any rights by his
translation or copyright and argued that they intended to use a different
translation, also produced with the consent of the original authors.171 The
court enjoined defendants from using Jackson’s translation, but did not
extend the injunction to the other translation.172 Noting that as an
authorized translator of the play, Jackson was “in the sense of the law, the
165. Id. at 207.
166. See Samuelson, supra note 159, at 1508–09.
167. Id. at 1519.
168. See Daniel Gervais, The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects Foxes Better
Than Hedgehogs, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 785, 799 (2013) (“When copyright moved doctrinally
beyond literal copying, the underlying concern was the (correct) realization that other appropriations,
including translation, dramatizations, and substantial (if not literal) copying, could cause an unjustified
harm to a copyright holder.”).
169. Shook v. Rankin, 21 F. Cas. 1335, 1336 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1875).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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author of that for which he obtained a copyright,” Circuit Judge
Drummond said that he failed to see why Jackson “was not protected under
the law for his translation and adaptation of the work to the stage, and of
which he was in one sense the author.”173
Debates over the appropriateness of giving authors control over
translations of their works have not been fully extinguished. Today, with
authors’ permission, translators can obtain the copyright to their
translations, which then have the status of original, rather than derivative
works.174 In a 1987 dispute between the writer of a biography of Igor
Stravinsky and the composer’s former personal assistant, the latter
asserted his inherited copyright to the English translations from Russian
of some of Stravinsky’s correspondence.175 Though the plaintiff spoke no
Russian, he had hired some Russian-speaking students to do initial, literal
translations of the correspondence, and “thereafter he reworked the
language, exercising his own authorship to achieve a diction he considered
suitable,” recasting the translations “in such a way as to imitate the unusual
manner in which Stravinsky spoke English.”176 The court agreed that
Stravinsky’s former assistant had a strong copyright claim to the
translations, either under a theory that his reworking of them was
substantial and original or under a “work for hire” theory involving the
students.177
Translations of religious works have long been, and continue to be,
a source of conflict. Agreeing that a translation of an English prayer-book
into Hebrew was sufficiently original to be copyrightable, the court in
Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc. said that
“[t]he translation process requires exercise of careful literary and scholarly
judgment.”178 Further, in Society of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc.
v. Gregory, a Greek Orthodox monastery that had produced original
translations of ancient religious works brought a copyright infringement
suit against an archbishop who had left the order and posted some of the
translations on his own website.179 One of the archbishop’s arguments, in
his defense, was that the works at issue were not original and therefore not
copyrightable—that they were “merely a commixture of various ancient
religious works that had previously been translated into English” with

173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2018).
175. Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120, 121–22 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
176. Id. at 125.
177. Id.
178. Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir.
2002).
179. Soc’y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2012).

2019]

From the Myth of Babel

135

minor changes.180 The Monastery argued that its translations were both
original and entitled to copyright protection under the Copyright Act’s
“express acknowledgement of the copyrightability of derivative works.”181
The court agreed that translations may be original and copyrightable
despite being derivative, as long as “there is originality in [the works’]
arrangement or selection.”182 The court also rejected the archbishop’s
argument that the “merger doctrine,” by which a copyright may be held
invalid if there is only a limited number of ways to express a given idea,
as “inapposite” because “the art of translation involves choices among
many possible means of expressing ideas.”183
By contrast, in Signo Trading Intern. Ltd. v. Gordon, a translator who
had been commissioned by the manufacturer of an electronic translation
system to translate English words into Arabic did not have a copyright
claim because the lists of words did not have the requisite degree of
originality and because the words on the list had been chosen by the
manufacturer.184
Echoing some of the views underlying the Chetwood and Stowe
opinions, in The Scandals of Translation: Towards an Ethics of
Difference, translator, translation theorist, and historian Lawrence Venuti
argues that translations are a unique category of derivative work in that
they do not involve literally copying a foreign text, but instead enter “into
a mimetic relation that inevitably deviates from the foreign language by
relying on target-language approximations.”185 Far from limiting the
market for an author’s work, Venuti suggests that translations may
potentially expand it “by demonstrating its value abroad.”186 He advocates
modifying the current copyright regime to incentivize translators, so that
if an author has not made use of translation rights within five years of
publishing a work, the first translator or publisher to translate that work
should be entitled to enjoy an exclusive translation right in the work for as
long as the translation remains in print.187
We argue that debates over the originality or derivative nature of
translations have thus far considered only human translators, but an urgent
need still remains to consider how applicable notions of originality and
derivation are to AI translations, for reasons we will discuss further.
180. Id. at 46.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 47.
183. Id. at 53.
184. Signo Trading Int’l Ltd. v. Gordon, 535 F. Supp. 362, 363 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
185. LAWRENCE VENUTI, THE SCANDALS OF TRANSLATION: TOWARD AN ETHICS OF
DIFFERENCE 64 (1998).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 65–66.
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B. The Present: Translation as a Derivative Work and the Author as
Owner
Currently, both United States law and international intellectual
property law view translations as derivative works, that is, as new products
containing significant portions of existing, copyrightable works.188 In
other words, a translated work is considered the original work dressed in
a different cloak.189 Whereas in the past, translations were necessarily the
work of multilingual individuals, in today’s 3A era, translations may also
be the product of popular AI translation programs, especially online.190
However, machine translations continue to lack the sophistication of those
produced by humans.191
There are five legal implications of defining translated works as
derivative. First, users of AI translation systems become infringers, subject
to legal penalties, when they translate copyrighted works without authors’
permissions. Second, anyone who wishes to translate a copyrighted work
must seek permission from the work’s author, who may grant a license for
the translation of the work.192 Third, users of AI translation may have to
pay authors for these licenses. Fourth, the author owns the resulting
translation, which is the legal default even when an author has granted
permission for a work to be translated; of course, the parties can negotiate
another outcome. Fifth, as long as the author owns the rights to a
translation, the author is entitled to any benefits resulting from the
translation; thus, the user should pay royalties to the author.193
In the United States, copyright protection extends to all “original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
188. See, e.g., Jason L. Cohn, The King James Copyright: A Look at the Originality of Derivative
Translations of the King James Version of the Bible, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 513, 516 (2005) (“The
main distinction between derivative works and original works is that original works are almost entirely
created from materials and ideas that originated with the author while derivative works are based
primarily on materials and ideas derived from other sources.”).
189. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018); Berne Convention, supra note 82.
190. See, e.g., Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 14,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html [https://perma.
cc/Q97E-RFKA].
191. See Henderson, supra note 136 (noting that “‘language’ is far more than just words” and
“[f]or machines to accurately translate, there needs to be as much abstract thinking as mathematical
calculations”).
192. See Business Considerations in Translations, in 2 LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT,
PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 5:140 (3d ed. 2018) (“[T]ranslators are authors who create new works
but whose rights are normally subordinated to the rights of the author of the underlying work. Most
frequently, translators are engaged under work for hire agreements and obtain no copyright interest in
their works.”).
193. Id.

2019]

From the Myth of Babel

137

device.”194 Little is required to satisfy the notion of originality in United
States copyright law, as the Supreme Court explained in its cornerstone
copyright case, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
Inc.: “Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work
was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”195
Examples of original works include literary, musical, dramatic, pictorial,
and architectural creations.196 Internationally, the Berne Convention states
that it covers “every production in the literary, scientific, and artistic
domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression,” and cites
“books, pamphlets and other writings” as examples.197 While the
Convention does not list originality as a prerequisite for copyright
protection, “most member states have an originality and independent
creation requirement.”198
In contrast to an original work, a derivative work is one “based upon
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording,
art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”199 International copyright
law considers translation an important form of derivative work.200 The
1886 Berne Convention first addressed the issue of copyright and
translation at the global level, granting authors the exclusive right to make
or authorize translations of their works for ten years.201 The 1896 revision
to the Convention extended this right to cover the entire copyright term,
and the 1908 revision “finally assimilated the translation right into general
reproduction rights.”202
Among the exclusive rights granted to authors of original works, the
Berne Convention lists “the right to translate”203 and “moral rights” which
encompass “the right to claim authorship of the work and the right to
object to any mutilation, deformation or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the work that would be prejudicial to the

194. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).
195. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
196. Id.
197. Berne Convention, supra note 82, at art. 1.
198. Susanna Frederick Fischer, Dick Whittington and Creativity: From Trade to Folklore, From
Folklore to Trade, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 5, 23 (2005).
199. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
200. Berne Convention, supra note 82, at art. 2.
201. Ketzan, supra note 47, at 208–09.
202. Id. at 209.
203. Berne Convention, supra note 82, at art. 8.
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author’s honor or reputation.”204 Since translations are derivative, authors
may protect the moral rights to their works by giving or withholding their
consent to commercial translations of their works.205
C. The Future Is Already Here: Are the Products of AI Translation
Derivative Works?
Authors own their copyrightable works. Therefore, applying the
derivative work doctrine to AI translation means that users of online AI
translation programs—including, but not limited to, Google Translate—
infringe stakeholders’ rights by creating unauthorized derivative works.
We argue that in the 3A era this conclusion faces challenges. First,
as globalization has made the notion of community international, online
translation tools have become a primary means of participating in cultural
life, enjoying the arts, and sharing in scientific advancement, as well as
seeking, receiving, and imparting “information and ideas of all kinds.”206
Allowing citizens to become acquainted with poems, stories, news and
other written material online through internet access is especially
important where access to such material offline may be limited or
nonexistent. Following this logic, the international community agreed in
the Marrakesh Treaty to create an exception to copyright law so that
visually impaired persons, who often lack access to writings, could access
copyrighted written materials by using digital tools to transfer the words
to audible form.207 On the other hand, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights also guarantees the moral rights of authors, and even where works
are translated by machines, copyright law and the derivative works
doctrine are applicable.208
AI online translation services are not human; however, humans are
the investors in and software designers of AI translation programs, and
they turn a profit from the use of these programs in the marketplace. In
Naruto et al. v. David Slater, the Ninth Circuit, citing the United States
Copyright Office, held that non-human animals could not be copyright
holders, associating authorship with a person’s control over a work.209 In
204. Summary of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886),
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/summary_berne.html
[https://perma.cc/3HW6-7D23].
205. Id.
206. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Red. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 art. 27,
at 71 (1948); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(2), Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
207. See Kaminski & Yanisky-Ravid, Marrakesh Treaty, supra note 51.
208. See sources cited supra note 125.
209. “We must determine whether a monkey may sue humans, corporations, and companies for
damages and injunctive relief arising from claims of copyright infringement . . . [W]e conclude that
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Naruto, an Indonesian macaque was found to have no copyright in a selfie
he had taken with a photographer’s camera because the Copyright Act
makes no mention of non-human animals;210 United States courts have
repeatedly referred to “persons” or “human beings” when analyzing
copyright authorship. Following the logic of the Naruto case, which
awarded authorship of the photograph to the photographer who set up the
camera, AI online translation authorship lies with the private companies
financing and developing the AI software. Naruto was not a participant in
the human economy, but companies such as Google are.
Another consideration is the active role users play in generating new
AI translations by providing corrections and suggested improvements.
There is a strong argument that existing copyright law fails to capture this
scenario, which sees many people contributing to a machine’s translation.
Even if the software that allows a machine to translate is the result of
programming and data-feeding by humans, who could be considered the
authors of whatever the machine generates, the presence of other
contributors muddies the waters. Consider the parallels with open-source
software: “Open source licenses . . . allow software to be freely used,
modified, and shared.”211 The code in programs such as Linux “is free and
available to the public to view, edit, and—for users with the appropriate
skills—to contribute to.”212 On AI online translation platforms, should
contributors be entitled to a share of the profits from their work? The
precise terms under which contributors correct online AI translations are
often unclear, yet the companies producing the software systems benefit
greatly from user contributions. Another relevant parallel is with the
comment sections of major news websites, where individuals contribute
their insights regarding current events and drive traffic to the websites.
Should they have no intellectual property rights to their comments? We
argue that the law is unclear on these issues, which are central to AI online
translation platforms.
Finally, the broad, far-reaching use of AI online translation systems
on computers and smartphones around the globe makes their post-hoc
regulation through the application of existing law difficult, as consumers

this monkey—and all animals, since they are not human—lacks statutory standing under the Copyright
Act.” Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 2018).
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Licenses & Standards, OPENSOURCE.ORG, https://opensource.org/licenses [https:
//perma.cc/B8GP-X2BS].
212. See What is Linux?, OPENSOURCE.ORG, https://opensource.com/resources/linux [https:
//perma.cc/ST9W-PCBM].
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have grown accustomed to using these tools.213 Enforcing existing
copyright law would be akin to banning all music downloads in the
Napster case214—possible, but what would be the result and would it best
serve the balancing goals of copyright law?
Taken together, these challenges posed by AI translation online
reveal a glaring legal void. The popularity of AI online translation and its
importance should prompt us to consider how the law can efficiently
address these issues. There are three approaches to address this question:
(1) existing law can sufficiently address these new situations and nothing
need be done save enforce copyright law and shut down online AI
translation programs; (2) IP laws in general, including copyright laws, are
so outdated as to be unusable when examining AI systems;215 and (3)
certain sections of copyright law have become outdated, and amendments
to existing law that take technological innovation into consideration are
necessary. Consider, for instance, that AI systems such as New
Rembrandt, are capable of producing their own art work and inventions;
these developments are not unlike AI translation. Yanisky-Ravid and
Luis–Antonio Velez–Hernandez previously suggested revising the legal
understanding of the term “creativity” so that it might encompass artworks
generated by AI systems.216 Here, we argue that while the balancing goals
of intellectual property laws remain relevant, AI systems present such
significant challenges to existing legislation and regulation that new legal
and digital tools are needed.217
V. RETHINKING COPYRIGHT’S APPLICABILITY TO AI TRANSLATION
Current copyright law defines users of AI translation tools as
lawbreakers, subject to severe penalties for their infringement. The
following discussion re-examines copyright law in the 3A Era and
challenges the system to better address and regulate the near-universal use
of AI translation systems. We first analyze the use of this advanced
technology from the perspective of copyright law before discussing the
troubling ramifications of this analysis and how to address them. Like
many other web-based products and services, AI translation systems pose
213. See Alex Suskind, 15 Years After Napster: How the Music Service Changed the Industry,
DAILY BEAST (June 6, 2014), https://www.thedailybeast.com/15-years-after-napster-how-the-musicservice-changed-the-industry [https://perma.cc/7K82-LF8E].
214. For further discussion of Napster, see infra notes 257–269.
215. See, e.g., Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 7, at 663–64.
216. See authorities cited supra note 88.
217. See, e.g., Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Kenneth S. Kwan, 3D Printing, the Road Ahead: The
Digitization of Products When Public Safety Meets Intellectual Property Rights—A New Model, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 921 (2017) (discussing the intersection of safety and intellectual property concerns
related to AI-generated products).
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specific copyright conundrums that, left unexamined, lead to a poor
balancing of the interests at the heart of intellectual property law.
A. Theoretical Justifications: The Tension Between Authors’ Rights and
Sharing Knowledge
Justifications for intellectual property laws and copyright take
various forms, but all wrestle with the fundamental tension between the
rights of creators and those of society at large.218 This friction has shaped
international agreements such as the Berne Convention and the domestic
copyright laws of different countries. In this Article, we examine the
theoretical underpinnings of intellectual property law and how they apply
to AI-generated translation systems. We argue that this analysis provides
a useful frame of reference for examining the copyright issues of
autonomous AI translation online.
Three traditional, internationally-dominant frameworks exist for
justifying or limiting intellectual property laws: the Utilitarian (or Law and
Economics) theory; the Labor theory; and the Personality theory. Analysis
of these traditional justifications, which all favor giving authors rights in
their creative works, indicates that copyright law should protect authors
from unauthorized online translation of these works.219
However, two other, more recent justifications, lead to different
conclusions. The first, the Distributive Justice Theory, stems from John
Rawls’s theory of justice and challenges the three main frameworks as
promoting insufficiently egalitarian outcomes.220 The second comes from
Lior Zemer’s work, The Idea of Authorship in Copyright, in which he
argues in favor of a more collective, or environmental, theory of copyright
based on the notion that individual creative processes are shaped by
surrounding culture, and therefore, the public at large should be a joint
author for every copyrighted work.221 While we will briefly discuss these
approaches to copyright law, it is important to note that they do not reflect
existing legislation.
The United States Constitution offers a prime example of the
Utilitarian justification for intellectual property rights: Article I, Section 8
grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
218. See, e.g., supra note 18.
219. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, The Hidden Though Flourishing Justification of Intellectual
Property Laws: Distributive Justice, National Versus International Approaches, 21 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 1, 5 (2017) (describing the theoretical justifications for intellectual property and focusing on
the distributive justice model).
220. Id. at 15–16.
221. See generally LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT (2007).
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exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”222 The idea
is that the government creates intellectual property rights to provide
creative individuals with a strong incentive to share the fruits of their labor
with the public at large. “[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the
engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of
one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas.”223 Absent such protections, free-riders, who had not
invested any efforts, time, money, or creative work could pilfer the ideas
of hard-working creative individuals who might be discouraged enough to
renounce their imaginative pursuits at a loss to the general public.224 By
granting artists, scientists, or writers exclusive rights over their works for
a limited number of years, this approach balances providing creative
individuals with benefits and furthering the public good. Currently,
copyright in the United States typically lasts for the life of the author plus
seventy years, with some variation in the case of works made for hire or
those made anonymously, or pseudonymous.225 According to a Utilitarian
theory of intellectual property, any regulation of AI online translation
programs must function as an incentive to authors to share their works with
the general public.
The Labor theory of intellectual property, which has strongly
influenced U.K. law, has Lockean underpinnings. In the Second Treatise
on Government, John Locke argued that
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet
every man has a “property” in his own “person.” This nobody has any
right to but himself. The “labour” of his body and the “work” of his
hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes
out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed
his labour with it, and joined it to something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his property . . . For this “labour” being the
unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a
right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and
as good left in common for others.226

222. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
223. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
224. See, e.g., Matt Jackson, Harmony or Discord? The Pressure Toward Conformity in
International Copyright, 43 IDEA 607, 614–15 (2003). “Intellectual property is particularly
susceptible to freeriders since a disproportionate share of the expense involved in creating intellectual
property goes toward the creation of the first copy. These first-copy costs can only be recouped if the
creator can control the distribution of successive copies.” Id.
225. How Long Does Copyright Protection Last?, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.
copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-duration.html [https://perma.cc/KS7P-DNWA].
226. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (2004).
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Applied to copyright, this philosophy seeks to balance benefiting
authors for their strenuous efforts and ensuring that the world at large is
not left empty-handed in the process. In the case of automated online
translation, this model suggests that authors’ consent is needed because
authors have a property right in their labor.
The Personality theory focuses more on the close connection
between creators and their works. Under this framework, creators should
own the property rights to their creations because these are a form of
highly personal self-expression.227 Civil law countries such as France,
Germany, and Italy favor the notion of inalienable moral rights,
recognizing that works contain an expression of the personality of their
authors.228 Viewed from this perspective, authors’ temporary monopoly on
the use of their works stems not from the effort they expended or from a
government incentive to produce more, but from the intimate, unique
connection authors have with their works. It also means that “corporate
entities and employers who hire third parties to create works for them do
not qualify as authors” because they were not involved in the deeply
individual process of creation.229 Following this approach, authors should
be able to control if and how their works are translated using AI systems
because the works are extensions of the authors as individuals.
The Distributive Justice theory challenges the first three by positing
that the law should set guidelines to ensure equitable distribution of
societal resources.230 Relying on John Rawls’ philosophical “veil of
ignorance,”231 this framework invites policymakers to devise intellectual
property laws while imagining that they do not know what social class
they belong to and what abilities they have.232 The idea is that the veil of
ignorance guides policymakers toward more naturally fair results.233
227. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 345
(1988) (describing a property owner’s view of “property as an expression of his self”).
228. Rigamonti, supra note 73, at 359 (“The copyright statutes currently in force in France,
Germany, and Italy contain provisions dedicated to the protection of the rights of disclosure,
attribution, integrity, and withdrawal. These rights are generally conceptualized as inalienable rights
of authors in their works . . . . [M]oral rights are rights of authors, which is to say that only those
human beings who actually create the work in question qualify as owners of moral rights.”).
229. Id.
230. See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 217, at 10.
231. See Chris Chambers Goodman, Beneath the Veil: Corollaries on Diversity and Critical
Mass Scholarships from Rawls’ Original Position on Justice, 13 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC.
JUST. 285, 287 (2007) (“John Rawls identifies the ‘original position,’ in which all actors are behind a
‘veil of ignorance,’ such that no one knows what qualities, attributes, privileges, and abilities each
person might hold. This veil of ignorance as to differences provides the first level playing field, a
vacuum even, from which all can discuss and debate issues of fairness and justice without any
influence of self-interest or self-preservation.”).
232. See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 217.
233. Id.
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Viewed this way, AI online translation programs should be limited by
copyright law only to the extent that this does not cause gross inequalities
of access to translated materials.
Finally, the Collective model proposed by Lior Zemer runs counter
to the notion that individual authors produce anything truly original in the
sense that they are always inspired by what surrounds them.234 In The Idea
of Authorship in Copyright, he wrote that “[e]very copyrighted entity
represents the creative collectivity. It is a joint enterprise of both the
individual author and the public.”235 According to this analysis, copyright
law in its existing form is based on a flawed premise of originality, and the
translation by AI systems of copyrighted material online should pose no
authorship obstacles, particularly as the AI systems are routinely fed on
contributions from a large pool of users.
Current law espouses neither the Distributive Justice theory nor the
Collective model; however, both frameworks are relevant to the ways in
which existing copyright law is ill-equipped to deal with AI translations
online.
B. The Fair Use Doctrine and AI Translation Online
Just as the invention of the printing press both facilitated the
unauthorized copying of original works and improved public access to
written materials, leading to the birth of copyright law, in the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries a proliferation of new internet services has led
to disputes stemming from the public’s unprecedented, widespread access
to copyrighted material.236 The internet has allowed people to share vast
quantities of material with one another around the world as never before,
facilitating global communication.237 However, the rapid diffusion of
content on the internet has also led to lawsuits as the tension between
authors’ rights and the public domain takes on new forms.238 Time and
234. LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT 1 (2007) (“Every copyrighted entity
represents the creative collectivity.”).
235. Id. at 1.
236. See Robert L. Shaver, Copyright Law in the Digital Age, 49 ADVOCATE 17 (2006) (“Before
the printing press, an author was not concerned about the unauthorized copying of original works,
because copying was so impractical as to be impossible. In fact, without the printing press, there was
no group of authors who made a living by writing. With the printing press it became possible for an
author’s works to be widely disseminated, and to actually make some money by being an author. With
the ability to copy came the need to control who could copy, and copyright law was born.”).
237. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 117 (1997) (“It is no exaggeration to
conclude that the internet has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory marketplace
of mass speech that this country—and indeed the world—has yet seen.”).
238. See Christopher Gagne, Canon AEDE: Publishers’ Protections From Digital
Reproductions of Works by Search Engines Under European Copyright Law, 29 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 203, 203 (2015) (“Google has become a household name throughout the world, offering a virtual
‘one stop shop’ for answers to questions on every topic imaginable. This convenience, however, comes
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again, courts are asked to evaluate whether use of this material is allowed
under the fair use doctrine, or whether it undermines the Founders’ goal
of promoting “the progress of Science and useful Arts.”239
Fair use is an affirmative defense to claims of direct copyright
infringement; the United States Copyright Act of 1976 provides guidance
on the American “fair use” doctrine, codified in section 107.240 It cites four
relevant factors for examining whether a particular use of an original work
is infringing or not: the purpose and character of the use (commercial or
noncommercial, transformative or reproductive); the nature of the
copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the original work used;
and the effect of such use upon the market, or potential market, of the
original work.241 The preamble to the Act’s fair use section specifically
cites “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship or research” as valid fair use
purposes.242 Courts conducting a fair use analysis seek to determine
“whether the copyright law’s goal of promoting the Progress of Science
and useful Arts would be better served by allowing the use than by
preventing it.”243 A fair use defense “presupposes good faith and fair
dealing, and one pertinent consideration is whether the user stands to profit
from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the
customary price.”244 American courts have often viewed commercial uses
of copyrighted material as presumptively unfair exploitations of authors’
monopoly privileges, while considering noncommercial uses of such
material, especially in the educational context, as presumptively
acceptable.245
Judges have paid special attention to two of the four fair use factors:
(1) whether a use is transformative in purpose, and (2) how a use affects
the market, or potential market, for an original work.246 An analysis of

at a cost: people often forgo the original published articles for the summary excerpt and original link
that Google and its competitors provide.”).
239. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
240. See generally C.T. Drechsler, Extent of Doctrine of “Fair Use” Under Federal Copyright
Act, 23 A.L.R.3d 139 (1969).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006).
244. Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations
omitted).
245. But cf. HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 15:42 (2017).
246. See Jennifer Pitino, Has the Transformative Use Test Swung the Pendulum Too Far in
Favor of Secondary Users?, 56 ADVOCATE 26, 28–29 (2013) (“According to the data, courts today
are virtually ruling 100% of the time that a transformative use is a fair use. This has in essence created
a per se rule that transformative use is fair use.”); see also Robert W. Haskin, Jr. & Julie A. Pace,
Photocopying Is Cheap—Copyright Infringement Is Not, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 1991, at 17, 18 (“[The]
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major United States copyright lawsuits indicates that, unlike other recent
technological advances such as home video recorders, searchable web
archives, or digital snippets of books, online translation programs fall
outside the scope of the fair use doctrine in its current form. We argue that
legislators should amend copyright law to carve out fair use exceptions to
certain uses of machine translation online.
C. Are AI Translation Services or Their Users Indirect Infringers?
Are internet-related companies, such as Google, accountable for
copyright infringement when they offer machine translation services
online? Or are the users of these services at fault? Before internet use was
widespread, courts still had to grapple with the ways in which
technological advances could facilitate copyright infringement.247 In
particular, courts have repeatedly addressed the issue of secondary
liability, whether in the form of contributory infringement—meaning that
a defendant did not directly engage in the infringing activity but somehow
promoted or induced it—or vicarious liability—meaning that a defendant
derived a direct financial benefit from infringing activity and had the
ability to interrupt it, but did not.248 Secondary liability for copyright
infringement assigns responsibility to those “who do not directly infringe
copyright rights, but, who, as a matter of fairness or to serve some other
overarching policy concern, should nonetheless be liable for the copyright
infringement of others taking place within their ambit.”249 One oft-cited
advantage of secondary liability is cost-effectiveness, as pursuing a single
case against a secondary infringer is less expensive than pursuing many
cases against direct, individual infringers.250
In Sony v. Universal City Studios, for example, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether manufacturers of home
videotape recorders were guilty of contributory infringement, since many
most important factor” of the fair use doctrine is that “which focuses on the effect of the use upon the
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.”).
247. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (holding that
“[w]e entertain no doubt that the constitution is broad enough to cover an act authorizing copyright of
photographs, so far as they are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author”).
248. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Colum. Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971) (“One who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes
to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer . . . [and] one may
be vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a
direct financial interest in such activities.”).
249. Craig A. Grossman, From Sony to Grokster, The Failure of the Copyright Doctrines of
Contributory Infringement and Vicarious Liability to Resolve the War Between Content and
Destructive Technologies, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 147 (2005).
250. See Lital Helman, Pull Too Hard and the Rope May Break: On the Secondary Liability of
Technology Providers for Copyright Infringement, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 111, 155–56 (2010).
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owners of the videotape recorders were using them to copy and save
television broadcasts, which are covered by copyright law.251 The Court
held that since some users were infringing and others were not, the
appropriate question to ask was whether the home videotape recorders
were “capable of commercially significant non-infringing uses.”252 After
determining that they were, the Court applied the fair use factors and noted
that although commercial uses of copyrighted material are presumptively
unfair, “[a] challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work
requires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should
become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the
copyrighted work.”253 In this instance, the Court was not persuaded that
some consumers’ use of the videotape recorders to copy television
programs was harmful to the market, and since use of the technology for
substantial non-infringing purposes was possible, the fair use doctrine
should apply.254
Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun penned a vigorous dissent, objecting
to the majority’s conclusion on the grounds that Congress had rejected a
“private use” exemption to copyright infringement, observing that fair use
does not apply “when a user reproduces an entire protected copyrightable
work and uses it for its original purpose, with no added benefit to the
public . . . [t]here is then no need whatsoever to provide the ordinary user
with a fair use subsidy at the author’s expense.”255
Changes in the way consumers could access music also raised new
copyright problems.256 In 2001, the Ninth Circuit heard the case of A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.257 A&M Records, a company that recorded,
distributed, and sold music, had sued Napster for contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement.258 Napster was a start-up business that
facilitated peer-to-peer file sharing, allowing its users to search for other
users’ files through a centralized index (a kind of electronic library card
catalog) before copying and saving them on their own computers.259 Since
Napster itself was not doing the file copying, and was merely providing

251. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 422–23, 434–42 (1984).
252. Id. at 442.
253. Id. at 451.
254. Id. at 455.
255. Id. at 472, 480.
256. See also Joshua P. Binder, The Future of Streaming Technology After Grokster, L.A. L.,
Dec. 2005, at 13 (noting that “several technological changes have converged to cause a sea change in
the way musical recordings can be delivered to consumers”). See generally Grossman, supra note 249
(discussing the challenges of copyright enforcement for online service providers).
257. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
258. Id. at 1010–11.
259. Id. at 1011.
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users with the centralized index and allowing them to connect with one
another, the court needed to address the issue of secondary liability.260
On the question of contributory infringement, the court examined
whether Napster knew or had reason to know of acts of infringement by
its users and whether it was materially contributing to such infringement;
because Napster was aware of user downloads of copyrighted music files
and because it facilitated such downloads through its centralized index, the
court found Napster was a contributory infringer.261 On the issue of
vicarious liability for infringement, the court asked whether Napster had
the ability to supervise its users and whether it benefited financially from
their infringement.262 Here, too, the court reasoned against Napster,
finding that it was vicariously liable for infringement because it was
materially benefiting from an infringement that it could have prevented.263
As a result of this lawsuit, Napster was effectively out of business,264 but
its demise led to the rise of music industry-supported commercial services
such as iTunes, which capitalize on user demand for single songs rather
than entire albums without infringing on artists’ copyrights.265
In 2005, the Supreme Court heard another music industry case:
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.266 Grokster was a
company that marketed itself as a successor to Napster, but it operated
without a centralized server; individual users of the service contacted each
other regarding what content they were willing to share using Grokster’s
Gnutella technology.267 The Court was not impressed, holding that “one
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties.”268 Whereas in the Sony case, the Court could not attribute specific
260. Id. at 1019, 1022.
261. Id. at 1022.
262. Id. at 1024.
263. Id.
264. See Napster, The Long Goodbye, ECONOMIST (May 16, 2002), http://www.economist.com
/node/1134869 [https://perma.cc/P5RX-5GKS] (reflecting on the demise of Napster as both “the
triumph of fat cats over humble music geeks” and a turning point in how consumers purchase music).
265. But see Sydney A. Beckman, The Copyright Crusher: How Apple’s iTunes Is a Vehicle
Designed for Copyright Infringement and Apple’s Legal Liability from Its Creation, 1 TEX. A&M L.
REV. 901, 909 (2014) (arguing that because iTunes allows the conversion of compact discs to a format
that works with various music players, it violates copyright holders’ exclusive rights).
266. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
267. Id. at 913.
268. Id. at 919; see also Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1346–47, 1362–65 (2004). The
authors note that “[s]uing actual infringers is becoming passé in digital copyright law. In the digital
environment, the real stakes so far have been in suing those who facilitate infringement by others.” Id.
at 1346.
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knowledge of infringement to Sony and was unwilling to impute such
knowledge to the company; in Grokster, the defendant company’s own
statements about its potential uses were evidence of vicarious
infringement.269
Collectively, these cases illustrate the attention United States courts
have paid not only to instances of direct copyright infringement, but also
to more indirect circumventions of the spirit of the law, which are often
made easier by emerging technologies. By implication, these cases raise
the following questions: Are users who paste copyrighted material into
machine translation programs and click the translate button infringers? Or
is the provider of these services the infringer? In short, are online machine
translation programs like Napster and Grokster? We think the parallels are
strong, but as we discuss further in this Article, amendments to copyright
law and the fair use doctrine could easily—and should—address the
problems of copyright infringement in AI online translation to provide a
more desirable outcome.
D. Purpose and Character: Transformative Use, Google Books and
HathiTrust
The first fair use factor, which examines the “purpose and character”
of a use, invites courts to consider whether a use “adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character” and does “not substitute for
the original use of the work.”270 An examination of United States case law
indicates that online translation does not meet this definition of
transformative.271
In 2004, Google started developing the Google Books Library
Project.272 Its goal was to scan the book collections of major libraries and
make the digitized information available to both the libraries and to the
general public, which would have access to randomized portions of the
books via Google’s search engine.273 Under United States copyright law,
copyright holders—such as the authors or publishers of books—have the
exclusive right (for a limited time) to make and sell copies of their works,
to create derivative works, and to perform or display their works
publicly.274 Although many of the works it was scanning were still in
269. Sony v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984); see also Grokster, 545 U.S. at
939.
270. More Information on Fair Use, U.S COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/fairuse/more-info.html [https://perma.cc/DXK6-U3TQ].
271. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub
nom. 136 S. Ct. 1658 (2016).
272. See Genan Zilkha, Fair Use: An Overview, 86 N.Y. ST. B.J. 40, 43 (2014).
273. Id.
274. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).

150

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:99

copyright, Google did not contact any authors or publishers as part of the
Google Books Library Project. In 2005, the writers’ advocacy group The
Authors Guild accused Google of committing large-scale copyright
infringement.275
Following two Second Circuit court decisions in favor of Google and
the United States Supreme Court’s denial of the Authors Guild’s petition
for certiorari, Google was free to pursue its Library Project under the fair
use doctrine’s four factors.276 Ultimately, the courts held that the Google
Books Library Project offered a transformative use of copyrighted works
that did not usurp authors’ rights to produce derivative works and did not
significantly affect the potential market for the authors’ works.277 The
Second Circuit held that use of digital copies to provide a search function
“augments public knowledge by making available information about
Plaintiffs’ books without providing the public with a substantial substitute
for matter protected by the Plaintiffs’ copyright interests in the original
works or derivatives of them.”278 The same was found true of Google’s
“snippet” function, which made small sections of original text visible.279
Thus, the use of copyrighted material was transformative in that its
purpose did not directly mirror that of the original authors. This analysis
would appear to not apply to online translation services, which provide
users with derivative works—translations—that are a substantial
substitute for authors’ copyright interests in their original works.
In a related case, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, authors and
various authors’ associations brought suit against an organization called
HathiTrust.280 Founded by a group of research universities to house digital
copies of their libraries, which they wanted to share with one another,
HathiTrust’s Digital Library (HDL) was a repository of “digital copies of
more than ten million works, published over many centuries, written in a
multitude of languages, covering almost every subject imaginable.”281 The
plaintiffs alleged that HathiTrust’s digitalization of copyrighted works
without author permission, and their conversion of works into formats for
print-disabled individuals, were violations of the Copyright Act.282 The
court came down on the side of fair use, guided principally by the fact that
275. See Zilkha, supra note 272.
276. See generally Fair Use: Mass Digitization of Books, in LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT,
PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 5:10.30 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter LINDEY ON
ENTERTAINMENT, § 5:10.30] (discussing case law).
277. Id.; see also Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2015).
278. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d at 207–08.
279. Id.
280. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2014).
281. Id. at 92.
282. See id.
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the service did not add into circulation entire works; it merely allowed
users to conduct “word searches” to locate specific phrases and page
numbers in digitized books.283 Thus, scanning the full works did not
amount to taking an excessive portion of the copyrighted works. Further,
the authors would not suffer economic injury because the service did not
serve as a substitute for their original works.
In its analysis, however, the court made several relevant comments
that suggest translations should be treated differently. To start, in its
definition of what constitutes transformative use of a copyrighted work,
the court noted that “[a] use is transformative if it does something more
than repackage or republish the original copyrighted work.”284 The court
disputed the notion that the use of digital copies to facilitate access for
print-disabled persons was transformative, noting that:
[A] transformative use adds something new to the copyrighted work
and does not merely supersede the purposes of the original creation .
. . . By making copyrighted works available in formats accessible to
the disabled, the HDL enables a larger audience to read those works,
but the underlying purpose of the HDL’s use is the same as the
author’s original purpose. Indeed, when the HDL recasts copyrighted
works into new formats to be read by the disabled, it appears, at first
glance, to be creating derivative works over which the author
ordinarily maintains control. As previously noted, paradigmatic
examples of derivative works include translations of the original into
a different language, or adaptations of the original into different
forms or media . . . . It is true that, oftentimes, the print-disabled
audience has no means of obtaining access to the copyrighted works
included in the HDL. But, similarly, the non-English speaking
audience cannot gain access to untranslated books written in English
and an unauthorized translation is not transformative simply because
it enables a new audience to read a work.285

While the court held that providing access to the print-disabled was
not a transformative fair use of copyrighted material, it found that such a
use was nevertheless a valid purpose supported by Supreme Court
decisions and statements from Congress, which carved out special
exceptions to copyright law to benefit the disabled. This suggests that,
absent congressional amendments to the Copyright Act, an automated
online translation of a copyrighted work would not be considered
transformative under the first fair use factor (purpose). The fact that it
283. Id. at 98 (“Because it was reasonably necessary for the HDL to make use of the entirety of
the works in order to enable the full-text search function, we do not believe the copying was
excessive.”).
284. Id. at 96.
285. Id. at 101 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
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enables a larger audience to read the work is insufficient to satisfy this
branch of the fair use doctrine.
E. Commercial Impact of Use
Under the fourth fair use factor, United States courts have also
addressed the commercial impact of unauthorized translations by
examining “whether, and to what extent, the unlicensed use harms the
existing or future market for the copyright owner’s original work.”286 In
evaluating this factor, courts “consider whether the use is hurting the
current market for the original work (for example, by displacing sales of
the original) and/or whether the use could cause substantial harm if it were
to become widespread.”287 Because unauthorized translations compete
with authorized translations and because poor quality translations may
harm an author’s moral rights, online translation programs are unlikely to
meet the test for fair use under the fourth factor.
United States courts have had occasion to examine fair use defenses
to unlicensed translations, looking at the impact they have on the market
for authors’ works. For example, in 1987, in Radji v. Khakbaz, a dispute
concerning the unauthorized translation of excerpts of an author’s work
published in an Iranian newspaper—after the same excerpts had appeared
with the author’s permission in a British newspaper—a district court judge
in the District of Columbia held that the fair use defense did not apply,
largely because “[d]efendants’ reprinting of the 80 days of diary entries in
a commercial publication was presumably intended to boost sales and thus
was for commercial rather than non-profit educational purposes.”288
In 1999, in Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data,
Inc., a Japanese publisher of financial, business, and industry news
brought a copyright and trademark infringement action against a United
States company and its officers based on the company’s sale of roughly
translated “abstracts” of the publisher’s news articles.289 The court held
that the defendant was guilty of infringement because the company’s news
abstracts precisely replicated the original publisher’s structure and
organization of facts.290
The Comline abstracts appear to be direct, if not word-for-word,
translations of the Nikkei articles, edited only for clarity. The average
Comline abstract uses about two-thirds of the protectible material in
286. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 270.
287. Id.
288. Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296, 1300 (D.D.C. 1985), amended, No. 84-0641, 1987
WL 11415 (D.D.C. May 15, 1987).
289. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1999).
290. Id. at 73.
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the corresponding Nikkei article. The abstracts track the information
in the articles sentence by sentence, in sequence; only occasionally
do the abstracts combine two Nikkei sentences, divide a sentence, or
rearrange the facts among different sentences. Comline adopts, by
and large, the exact same structure and organization of the facts
reported by Nikkei.291

Though careful to highlight that facts are not copyrightable, the court
here focused on the sale of abstracts that were essentially replicas of
copyrighted news articles, translated quickly by human employees.292 The
actions taken by the defendants in both of these cases, except for paying
at least some attention to quality and abstracting the content, are highly
similar in their commercial nature to those of automated translating
systems.293 Though automated translation providers may not directly
charge users for translations, they are for-profit companies that are able to
sell advertising and user data, making their use of authors’ works
commercial.
F. The Fair Use Doctrine Does Not Cover AI Translation—But Maybe It
Should, Sometimes
AI translation online presents an unusual set of copyright issues that
United States courts have not yet directly addressed. However, based on
case law focused on other technological innovations, it appears that the
current fair use doctrine would not apply to the machine translation of
copyrighted material online. These examples illustrate tensions similar to
those that arise with the proliferation of translation tools online. Authors
have the right to make copies and create derivative versions of their works,
and according to the Berne Convention, this means they have the “right to
translate” their works; yet automated online translation systems do not
seek permission from authors to translate their works.294 Further, while
Sony home video recorders faithfully reproduced original television
291. Id. at 71.
292. Id.
293. See Douglas L. Rogers, Increasing Access to Knowledge Through Fair Use—Analyzing the
Google Litigation to Unleash Developing Countries, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 63 (2007)
(“[In] both Radji and Nihon . . . the translations of defendants were sold commercially and were
substitutes for the translations of the plaintiffs.”).
294. See, e.g., Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies
/terms [https://perma.cc/MK2A-Z22N]. The company states that it provides its services “as is,” and
makes no warranties about “the content within the services, the specific functions of the services, or
their reliability, availability, or ability to meet your needs.” Id. The terms also instruct users not to
misuse Google services, and note that use of the services does not give users ownership of any
intellectual property rights over content they may access. Id. However, Google itself is using
copyrighted material for profit. See id.
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content and Napster facilitated the sharing of existing songs, translation
services often produce distorted, poor quality translations of original
works which may harm authors’ reputations.295 Like Sony, translation
services could argue that they merely provide users with a tool, similar to
a video recorder or a camera, and that they cannot be held responsible for
any infringing uses of the tool. However, end-users of these services are
accessing complete original works in unauthorized derivative form, and
such use is inherently infringing, rather than substantially non-infringing,
and services such as Google Translate are fully aware of the fact because
they explicitly offer to translate entire pages of web content.296 In this
sense, translation services closely resemble Napster or Grokster, as they
know of infringing uses of their platforms, encourage rather than limit
them and also benefit financially from them.
The way the HathiTrust court applied the fourth fair use factor,
which looks at the market impact of a contested use of a copyrighted work,
also indicates that translations could be protected in a way that the page
numbers and keyword searches of Google Books are not because
translation services may undermine authors’ reliance on quality
translations for their works. The HathiTrust court held that the fair use
“doctrine is generally subject to an important proviso: A fair use must not
excessively damage the market for the original by providing the public
with a substitute for that original work.”297 For example, a book review
that quotes from a book is acceptable as fair use both because it is not a
substantial portion of the work in question and because—even if the
review is negative and discourages readers from buying the book, causing
economic harm to the author—the review is not a substitute for the
book.298 Fair use also allows an internet search engine to “display lowresolution versions of copyrighted images in order to direct the user to the
website where the original could be found.”299 Translations of web pages
295. See STEINER, supra note 26; see also FREEDMAN, supra note 25.
296. See, e.g., GOOGLE TRANSLATE, https://translate.google.com [https://perma.cc/HDA3V4XP]. The company invites users to automatically view any web page in their preferred language.
Id.; see also BING TRANSLATE, https://www.bing.com/translator [https://perma.cc/DB8V-S9UC].
Microsoft, the progenitor of Bing Translate, also invites users to “[i]nstantly translate [their] text from
one language to another with Translator for Bing.” Try Microsoft Translator for Free, MICROSOFT
TRANSLATOR, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/translator/business/trial/ [https://perma.cc/KP5WGV2U]; see also Machine Translations for Personal, Business and Enterprise Usage, SYSTRAN,
http://www.systransoft.com/lp/machine-translation [https://perma.cc/FS8V-7C3J]. The company
explains that “[the software] lets you understand foreign language information—like any Web page,
document or email—in the language of your choice in real-time.” Machine Translations for Personal,
Business and Enterprise Usage, SYSTRAN, http://www.systransoft.com/lp/machine-translation
[https://perma.cc/FS8V-7C3J].
297. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2014).
298. Id.
299. Id.
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or articles are often not mere quotes or the equivalent of low-resolution
thumbnails, but they are the entirety of a copyrighted work,300 and reading
such a translation may substitute a search for the original work or an
authorized translation of it—especially as the translation services do not
direct users to alternate sources with better-quality translations.
Finally, the HathiTrust court cited the importance of mass download
prevention systems when it noted that even where the libraries involved in
the case permitted works to be read online, they made efforts to ensure that
“inappropriate levels of access” did not take place.301 Currently, no such
barriers prevent automated services from translating copyrighted material
online.
However, legislators could easily change this by carving out a special
set of fair use factors that apply to AI translation online. These could
specify that automated translation of certain material on the web is noninfringing even when it covers the entire protected copyrightable work.
For instance, fair use could be extended to the automated translation of
“snippets” of text on the web, sufficient to get the gist of content without
reproducing it entirely. This approach would mirror that of the Second
Circuit in the Google Books Library Project, which focused on the amount
and substantiality of copyrighted works being made available to internet
users.302 It would allow the de minimis translation of copyrighted material
useful to people conducting research online while prohibiting the
wholesale translation of lengthy news articles without the publishers’
consent. Fair use could also consider damage to the markets for an original
work and for a translation of it, looking at the impact of an automated
translation on an author’s ability to profit from his work as well as any
reputational damage arising from a poor translation, echoing the concerns
of Radji and Nihon.303 In many instances, where the amount of text
translated is minimal and for private use, AI web translations would easily
clear this hurdle.
Challenges to these explicit limitations are likely to arise from those
who argue that copyright law in general has grown too expansive, at the
expense of broad public access to knowledge.304 Yet failure to protect
300. See Ketzan, supra note 47, at 233. The author notes that the fair use doctrine could cover
machine translation “were it not for the fact that it translates entire Web pages.” Id.
301. Authors Guild, Inc., 755 F.3d at 100 (citing the HathiTrust Digital Library Executive
Director).
302. See LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, supra note 276, at § 5:10.30.
303. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999);
Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296, 1300 (D.D.C. 1985), amended No. 84-0641, 1987 WL 11415
(D.D.C. May 15, 1987).
304. See, e.g., Jenny Lynn Sheridan, Copyright’s Knowledge Principle, 17 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 39 (2014).
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authors’ rights can also diminish public access by discouraging creators
from sharing their works in the first place.305 An analysis of the copyright
issues of translation cannot ignore that the companies providing
translation on the web are for-profit multinationals. While international
copyright law creates exceptions for educational or research purposes,
these special cases do not extend to the unauthorized use of copyrighted
material for financial gain.306
Lawmakers should act to clarify which uses of AI online translation
qualify as fair use to preserve copyright law while also facilitating the
public’s access to culture and knowledge.
G. Comparative Perspective: Ideas from Abroad
While the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France
all recognize copyright law and grant authors limited monopolies over
their works, each of these jurisdictions also carves out exceptions, creating
limited circumstances under which use of an author’s material without
permission does not constitute copyright infringement.307 “From its
beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant
changes in technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of
copying equipment—the printing press—that gave rise to the original need
for copyright protection.”308 Because AI translation platforms are global,
the theoretical justifications for copyright law in different countries
provide an important means for analyzing this new technological
development and its creation of copyright disputes.
1. Copyright in the United Kingdom, Canada, and France
In its emphasis on protecting the property rights of original works
produced by creative labor, the United Kingdom “approach fits fairly
neatly with John Locke’s labour theory as a justification of property
rights.”309 The United Kingdom’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
1988 protects “(a) original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, (b)
sound recordings, films [or broadcasts], and (c) the typographical
arrangement of published editions” and grants all authors the right of
305. See, e.g., Thomas M. Gage, Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories: Copyright
Protection for Computer Software Structure—What’s the Purpose?, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 859, 887
(1987) (arguing that copyright for computer programs advances the public welfare and “copyrights
encourage the development of new programs by allowing owners to exclude free riders and recover
developmental costs”).
306. See Berne Convention, supra note 82, at arts. 10 and 10bis.
307. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
308. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984).
309. ESTELLE DERCLAYE, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT 288
(2009).
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reproduction or the right to control how and when copies of their works
are made.310 Depending on the type of work at issue, the UK also grants
authors the distribution right, the rental right, the public performance right,
the communication right, and the adaptation right.311
Like the United States, the United Kingdom allows some exceptions
to copyright, known as “fair dealing” exceptions. These, however, are
more limited than their United States counterparts.312 Fair dealing allows
some use of copyrighted material for purposes of non-commercial research
or study, criticism and review, or news reporting.313 To use this defense,
the claimed infringer must show not only that the copying falls into one of
these three categories, but also that it is “fair” and often, that it contains
sufficient acknowledgement for the original author.314 Factors when
considering the “fairness” of the copying can include the quantity of the
work taken, the infringer’s motives, and how the infringement will affect
the author’s returns for the copyrighted work.315 In 2014, the United
Kingdom introduced a new fair dealing exception, allowing some text and
data mining as long as these were done for non-commercial research
purposes.316 Copyright law in the United Kingdom typically lasts for “70
years from the end of the calendar year in which the last remaining author
of the work dies.”317
Canadian copyright law was passed with the Copyright Act of
Canada in 1921 and amended in 1988, 1997, and 2012.318 The Act covers
“every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work,” but also
performances, sound recordings and communication signals,319 and gives
authors copyright —which covers the right to “produce, reproduce,
perform or publish any translation of the work”320—moral rights and
“neighbouring” rights. Moral rights include attribution, integrity, and
association, allowing authors to have some control over what their work is
associated with, while neighbouring rights pertain to the performance,
transmission, and reproduction of creative works and are especially
relevant in the music industry.321 Fair dealing exceptions cover “research,
310. The Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, c. 1 (UK).
311. Id. at c. 2.
312. Id. at c. 3.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 (Can.).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. See Royalties, Neighbouring Rights, Private Copying Levy, MUSICIANS’ RTS ORG. CAN.,
https://musiciansrights.ca/en/royalties/ [https://perma.cc/9RQ6-DDKM].
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private study, education, parody or satire,” “criticism and review,” and
“news reporting.”322 There is also an exception for “non-commercial usergenerated content,” which allows some use of materials available to the
public subject to the following exceptions:
(a) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or
other subject-matter is done solely for non-commercial purposes;
(b) the source — and, if given in the source, the name of the author,
performer, maker or broadcaster — of the existing work or other
subject-matter or copy of it are mentioned, if it is reasonable in the
circumstances to do so;
(c) the individual had reasonable grounds to believe that the existing
work or other subject-matter or copy of it, as the case may be, was
not infringing copyright; and
(d) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or
other subject-matter does not have a substantial adverse effect,
financial or otherwise, on the exploitation or potential exploitation of
the existing work or other subject-matter — or copy of it — or on an
existing or potential market for it, including that the new work or
other subject-matter is not a substitute for the existing one.323

Canada has two official languages, English and French, and the
Official Languages Act requires the federal government to provide
services to citizens in both languages.324 Canada is also a Crown copyright
country, meaning special copyright rules cover the distribution of stateproduced materials.325 Copyright in Canada lasts for the lifetime of an
author plus fifty years.326
The first article of the French Intellectual Property Code is
unambiguous in emphasis: it states that “[l]’auteur d’une oeuvre de
l’esprit” (the author of a work of the spirit) by virtue of its creation alone,
enjoys an exclusive property right in the work.327 French droit d’auteur
322. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 § 29 (Can.).
323. Id.
324. Frequently Asked Questions, CAN. OFF. OF THE COMM’R OF LANGUAGES (last modified
NOV. 2, 2011), http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/en/resources/frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/
3ARA-29BS].
325. Crown Copyright Request, When to Apply for Crown Copyright Clearance, GOV. OF CAN.
PUBLICATIONS (last modified Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/
services/crown-copyright-request.html [https://perma.cc/V3LH-FRBP]. In the United States, by
contrast, section 105 of the Copyright Act states that federal government works are in the public
domain. Policies: Public Domain & Copyright Notice, U.S. GOV’T PUB. OFF., https://www.gpo.gov
/help/public_domain_copyright_notice.htm [https://perma.cc/5JAR-WB3P].
326. Canada Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, § 12 (Can.).
327. CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROPR. INTELL.] [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CODE] art. L111-1 (Fr.) (emphasis added).
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(author’s rights) protects any original work, expressed in any form; thus,
unlike the United States and UK, France does not require the work to be
recorded in a tangible medium of expression, and covers, for example,
original choreography.328 The Code defines two distinct sets of rights for
authors: droits patrimoniaux (proprietary rights) and droits moraux (moral
rights).329 Once an author’s work has been published, French law carves
out limited exceptions for non-infringing uses of the work, ranging from
private family performances to research, press critiques, diffusion of
current news, and parody, among others.330 Copyright in France lasts for
an author’s lifetime plus seventy years,331 with some variation for
posthumous works or those by authors who died in battle defending
France.332
In each of these jurisdictions, copyright law strives to protect
authors’ rights while recognizing that there are limited circumstances in
which the public’s use of original material should not be considered
infringing. Technological advances often pose legal challenges as
different jurisdictions seek to maintain this balance.333
2. Web Innovation and Copyright Law Outside the United States
An examination of internet copyright issues from other jurisdictions
suggests that there, too, online translation would likely fall outside the
parameters of fair dealing or other exceptions to infringement. In the
United Kingdom and Canada, problems arise under a fair dealing analysis
because the non-commercial purpose of the translation would not be
satisfied: the companies providing the translations are commercial
enterprises.334 In addition, the amount of material such programs copy is
currently unlimited, and while it is unclear how translation could affect the
market for individual authors’ works, it could conceivably harm the
market for good-quality translations, which would violate fair dealing
328. Id. at art. L112-2.
329. Id. at arts. L111-1, L121-1, L122-1.
330. Société des Gens de Lettres, Les exceptions au droit d’auteur, https://www.sgdl.org/
juridique/la-minute-juridique-de-la-sgdl-sur-webtv/758-les-exceptions-au-droit-dauteur (last visited
Nov. 27, 2017).
331. CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE] art. L123-1
(Fr.).
332. Id. at arts. L123-4, L-123-10.
333. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984).
334. See Michael Geist, Why Copyright Law Poses a Barrier to Canadian AI Ambitions, GLOBE
& MAIL (May 17, 2017), https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary
/why-copyright-law-poses-a-barrier-to-canadian-ai-ambitions/article35019241/?ref=http://www.
theglobeandmail.com [https://perma.cc/RTG7-CETG]. Geist, a Canadian professor specialized in
internet and e-commerce law, argued that the country’s copyright laws “may hamper the ability of
companies and researchers to test and ultimately bring new AI services to market.” Id.
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principles.335 Further, unlike internet service providers, which the
Supreme Court of Canada held are not users under the country’s Copyright
Act336 (and therefore do not have to pay royalties for illegally downloaded
music), translation programs would likely fall under sections 2.4(1) and
2.4(1.1) of the Act, which cover “communication to the public by
telecommunication” and provide that “communication of a work or other
subject-matter to the public by telecommunication includes making it
available to the public by telecommunication in a way that allows a
member of the public to have access to it from a place and at a time
individually chosen by that member of the public.”337 In France, which
places significant emphasis on moral rights, translations online may face
barriers not only for their infringement on the rights of reproduction and
translation but also because they deprive authors of the right to preserve
the integrity of their works.338
Many European Union publishers have voiced dissatisfaction with
the relative lack of regulation of major search engines, and “[s]ome E.U.
member states have responded . . . by implementing legislation that
requires search engines to pay a tax to publishers for displaying these
excerpts on their search results page.”339 Spain, for instance, passed
legislation in 2015 requiring Google to pay publishers a tax if it wanted to
provide links to the publishers’ content.340 Writing in the Temple
International and Comparative Law Journal, Christopher Gagne argued
that such a move would help counteract the exploitation by search engine
powerhouses of publishers’ works for commercial gain, which tends to
“[eliminate] fair competition within the industry, and [remove] the
incentive to innovate among publishers.”341 By creating a tax on the
publication of article content, Gagne suggested that legislation, such as
that introduced in Spain, would “eliminate search engines’ ability to
leverage their dominant position within the digital market against
publishers’ rights to compensation for reproduction of their original
works.”342

335. See The Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, c. 1 (UK).
336. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Music Publishers of Can. v. Can. Ass’n of Internet
Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 (Can. S.C.C.); see also Julie DeWeese, Legislating Against Copyright
Infringement Across Borders: An Examination of Canada’s Efforts to Keep Pace with Technology, 17
L. & BUS. REV. AM. 347 (2011).
337. Canada Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C.-42.
338. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, Rationale for Droit Moral, in 5 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 16:2
(2017).
339. Gagne, supra note 238, at 204.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
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The Spanish legislation is also indicative, however, of a generalized
European distrust of the monopoly Google, in particular, has established
online, and a resistance to the notion that because web aggregators may
provide additional access to original content, they should be immune from
claims of copyright infringement.343 We argue that copyright protection
should not “prevent the normal functioning and the development of new
technologies, but . . . it is necessary to ensure an adequate protection of
copyright in the information society. Technological development allows,
in fact, faster and easier reproduction of works, for which reason
protection of copyright must adapt to this technological development.”344
Further, as the internet assumes an ever-more-dominant role in the way
people communicate with one another, European countries have
questioned the power of companies facilitating such communication,
expressing concerns that these large firms have “so far slipped through the
regulatory net, operating without burdens and without regulation.”345
Numerous European countries reacted unfavorably to the 2005
Google Books ruling in the United States,346 and it is unlikely that a similar
result would have emerged in the European Union.347 In 2009, French
publishing group La Martinière and others similarly situated won a lawsuit
against Google for copyright infringement, after Google included books
from the publishing group in its Google Books Library Project without
permission.348
Specifically, La Martinière alleged a violation of its right of
reproduction, copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and unfair
competition.349 The French publishers’ union (Syndicat national de
343. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
344. See Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int’l v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 E.R.C. I-06569 ( “The
storing and subsequent printing of an extract from a newspaper article which contains the search word
and the five words which precede and follow it must be considered as a reproduction within the
meaning of Article 2 of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information
society.”).
345. See Emily B. Laidlaw, Private Power, Public Interest: An Examination of Search Engine
Accountability, 17 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 113, 114 (2009).
346. Kevin J. O’Brien & Eric Pfanner, Europe Divided in Google Book Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/technology/internet/24iht-books.html [https://perma.
cc/W7T9-XMGY].
347. Raquel Xalabarder, Google Books and Fair Use: A Tale of Two Copyrights?, 5 J. INTELL.
PROP., INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COMM. L. 53, 56 (2014) (“It is very unlikely that a similar result
could be achieved under any EU law. Fair use does not exist in Europe on a general basis.”).
348. Tribunal de grande instance Paris, Dec. 18, 2009, SAS Éditions du Seuil et a. c/ Sté Google
Inc., No. 09/00540.
349. Olivier Chicheportiche, Droit d’auteur: Google Contre-attaque, La Martinière Réclame 15
Millions d’euros, ZDNET (Sept. 25, 2009), https://www.zdnet.fr/actualites/droit-d-auteur-googlecontre-attaque-la-martiniere-reclame-15-millions-d-euros-39707865.htm
[https://perma.cc/E7ZN72V8].

162

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:99

l’édition) and the Société des gens de lettres (SGDLF), a writers’
association founded in 1838 by Honoré de Balzac, Victor Hugo,
Alexandre Dumas and George Sand, had joined the lawsuit in support of
La Martinière.350 The French court’s finding of copyright infringement
prevented Google from including French works that were still in copyright
in its Books project, although it was able to draw on works for which the
copyright had expired.351 Though Google initially appealed the ruling, in
2011 it signed an agreement with La Martinière covering out-of-print
editions, and this deal ended the legal dispute between the companies.352
Such agreements appear to be a common compromise: in 2013, Google
and French government officials struck a deal that would quash proposed
legislation similar to the Spanish tax, on the condition that Google support
the digitization of French publications through major financial
investments.353
In Europe, as in the United States, courts continue to grapple with
the best way to balance copyright protection with technological and—in
particular—internet innovation. In 2016, as part of its proposed update of
European Union copyright rules, the European Commission suggested a
new copyright exception that would allow research organizations to use
text and data mining tools to analyze digital content that has been lawfully
acquired or accessed.354 This suggests that any fair use-type exceptions to
translation online may be palatable to European courts only in a noncommercial, research-driven setting. Because AI online translation
platforms reach a global audience, United States lawmakers must work
with their counterparts in Canada, Europe, and around the world in closing
the gaps of today’s copyright law, which must be updated to reflect new
technological advances.
VI. CRAFTING A MORE BALANCED SOLUTION
Can copyright law address the unusual problems posed by AI
translation online? Online translation services continue to suffer from
inherent issues as to quality and bias—issues which can ultimately deform
350. SOCIETE DES GENS DE LETTRES, https://www.sgdl.org [https://perma.cc/87GB-76FW].
351. See Tribunal de grande instance Paris, Dec. 18 2009, SAS Éditions du Seuil et a. c/ Sté
Google Inc., No. 09/00540.
352. Google et La Martinière Trouvent un Accord sur la Numérisation des Livres, LE MONDE,
(Aug. 25, 2011), https://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2011/08/25/google-et-la-martinieretrouvent-un-accord-sur-la-numerisation-des-livres_1563287_651865.html
[https://perma.cc/J87TSMJA].
353. Gagne, supra note 238, at 215.
354. Commission Proposes Copyright Exception for Researchers, EUR. COMMISSION (Sept. 14,
2016), http://ec.europa.eu/research/index.cfm?pg=newsalert&year=2016&na=na-140916 [https://
perma.cc/F72J-S54D].
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an author’s original work. In addition, the proliferation of cheap, poorquality translations can effectively harm or destroy the market for the
underlying work itself, as well as for good translations in general.355
On the other hand, online translations—especially into languages
that are not widely spoken—can bring news and ideas to places that would
never otherwise have access to them. In addition to broadening people’s
linguistic horizons, these advanced technological tools have a place in the
public sphere where precision and style are of secondary importance and
what really matters is getting a taste of another culture.356 There is a market
for AI translation, and it would be short-sighted to ignore and create
meaningless legal hurdles for users.
This Article advocates greater balance to minimize the harms of AI
translation services while maximizing their benefits. In its current form,
the copyright regime cannot withstand the rapid developments of AI and
online machine translation tools. Given the wide-scale use of Google
Translate and its kin, enforcing existing copyright restrictions without
making any adjustments would be a futile and inefficient means of
balancing the public and private interests at the heart of intellectual
property law justifications, whichever justification one adopts. We cannot
stop technological progress; nor should we try.
Instead, it is time to take practical measures by combining legal and
digital tools to address the copyright problems of AI translation online.
The ultimate goal should be to continue promoting authors’ rights while
enabling access to knowledge and to cultural assets. New solutions must
function across jurisdictions and stand the test of time and evolving
technology.357
Currently, in the absence of rules specifically addressing online
translation, the law ignores the copyright violations it causes. Instead, the
law favors the interests of big companies such as Google and Microsoft,
which have almost unlimited access to copyrighted materials to mine for
profit by engaging with users and selling related advertising.358 Although
consumers can use online translation services without pulling out their
355. See Ketzan, supra note 47.
356. See id. at 233 (noting that online machine translation of a work may expand the market for
it if the translation “piques the curiosity” of speakers of other languages).
357. See, e.g., Shira Perlmutter, Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means
to Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 325 (2002) (“It is
increasingly clear that the copyright balance, and its effect on incentives and the public interest, cannot
be confined to a purely domestic sphere.”).
358. See GOOGLE SAFETY CTR., https://safety.google/privacy/data [https://perma.cc/5DRKK7JX]; see also Mark Hachman, The Price of Free: How Apple, Facebook, Microsoft and Google Sell
You to Advertisers, PCWORLD (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.pcworld.com/article/2986988/privacy/theprice-of-free-how-apple-facebook-microsoft-and-google-sell-you-to-advertisers.html [https://perma.
cc/42FV-4QSX].
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wallets, they are not receiving a free product: they (we) are paying with
their (our) data. In 2017, for example, news reports indicated that
Translate.com, which provides a free machine translation service powered
by Microsoft Translator, had indexed a large volume of highly sensitive
material its users had been translating, from termination letters to a global
bank’s staff performance report.359 The company’s Terms & Conditions
stated that Translate.com could not and did not “guarantee that any
information provided to [them] by you will not become public under any
circumstances.”360 It further provided that “[y]ou should appreciate that all
information submitted on the website might potentially be publicly
accessible.”361
In the next sub-section, we will describe our new proposed
framework. We argue for balance between the conflicting goals at issue
and suggest that balance is best achieved with a combination of digital and
legal tools. We need to make more room for authors’ rights without
shutting down AI translation programs, which is possible by setting limits
on the amount and type of content that may be translated automatically
online and by requiring software designers to adopt a “fair use by design”
approach to their AI translation systems that implements legal
guidelines.362
Our framework is based on several conclusions drawn from the
above discussions.
First, the law requires greater consideration for authors’ rights in
translations of their works—and in quality translations in general—but not
at the expense of web-based cross-cultural exchange in the process.
Second, legislators should generally allow the free use of AI translation
programs, but clearly delineate the amount and type of content that may
be translated automatically online and allow authors to opt out of having
their webpages available for automatic machine translation. Third, AI
translation platforms should adhere to fair use guidelines by design.
Finally, policymakers should set guidelines establishing the reach of the
fair use doctrine in AI translation, stating explicitly what constitutes an
infringement, and WIPO should join this effort, devising its own norms in
collaboration with policy makers internationally to ensure the rules’ global

359. Florian Faes, Translate.com Exposes Highly Sensitive Information in Massive Privacy
Breach, SLATOR (Sept. 7, 2017), https://slator.com/technology/translate-com-exposes-highlysensitive-information-massive-privacy-breach [https://perma.cc/4J6Q-72CP].
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1085 (2017) (arguing
that “for fair use to serve its role in the twenty-first century, the checks that it intends to create on the
rights of authors must also be embedded in the design of online systems”).
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applicability. By reducing uncertainty, this framework will protect all of
the interests at the core of intellectual property law.
A. First Conclusion: It’s Time for New Fair Use Guidelines and Digital
Traffic Lights
The law should respect the rights of authors to control use of their
works—and not give large multinational corporations a free pass to use
any work which is accessible to the public—but it should accomplish this
aim without impeding technological developments. As a first step,
lawmakers should delineate what amount and, under what circumstances,
AI translation constitutes fair use.
In his 2007 article examining the copyright issues of translation, Eric
Ketzan discussed creating an affirmative “you may translate” metatag,
which translation providers could offer authors as an explicit license.363
Metatags are behind-the-scenes HTML code on webpages. Although they
would not entirely prevent unauthorized translation from occurring,364
they would promote a greater awareness of copyright on behalf of
consumers and give authors more options without entirely restricting
digital innovation. Indeed, many authors, keen on reaching new readers
around the globe and gaining renown, may gladly acquiesce to the
automatic translation of their content; the key is that their consent would
be voluntary, not an imposition by a for-profit company. If the law
required online translation service providers to use digital traffic lights,
giving authors the ability to permit or reject translations, authors and
service providers could work together: authors might actually be involved
in translating their works and could receive compensation for them. The
more in demand an author’s works in different languages, the more the
author could profit from partnering with an AI translation service provider.
Just as Napster and Grokster paved the way for iTunes by revealing
consumer demand for music online,365 so could translation programs
evolve in a direction that builds on people’s desire to communicate without
infringing copyright law.
We do not think metatags usage is the only viable approach, but the
underlying idea has merit: by legally requiring software developers to give
authors more choices concerning the automatic translation of their works
online, both authors and service suppliers could profit from translations in

363. Ketzan, supra note 47, at 230–32.
364. Id. Ketzan notes that users could still paste text into a box, even if the translation program
blocked the insertion of a particular URL. Id.
365. See Kelly Leong, iTunes: Have They Created a System for International Copyright
Enforcement?, 13 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 365 (2007).
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the global marketplace.366 Policymakers should establish new fair use
guidelines for AI translations.
B. Second Conclusion: AI Translation Programs Should Promote Fair
Use by Design367
In his book Privacy’s Blueprint: The Battle to Control the Design of
New Technologies, Woodrow Hartzog persuasively discussed the
importance of product design in shaping behavior and protecting privacy:
“Through signals, design helps define our relationships and our risk
calculus when dealing with others. Design affects our expectations about
how things work and the context within which we are acting.”368 In a
similar vein, policymakers have suggested that privacy concerns should be
addressed at the outset of product design, rather than post hoc once
problems emerge.369 In other words, “privacy initiatives should be
‘proactive, not reactive, preventative, not remedial.’”370
Analogously, AI translation programs should use software design
that facilitates compliance with fair use of copyrighted material through
appropriate signaling, rather than encouraging copyright violations.
Designers of these programs and their stakeholders “must begin with
oversight and accountability in mind”371 as this will encourage authors to
participate in, rather than avoid, content-sharing platforms online. Users,
meanwhile, will still be able to make de minimis use of translated
copyrighted material without facing unreasonable hurdles.

366. See John S. Sieman, Using the Implied License to Inject Common Sense into Digital
Copyright, 85 N.C. L. REV. 885, 887–89 (2007) (“First, an opt-in system preserves personal autonomy
—the individual is not included unless he wants to be. This allows him the freedom to balance the
costs and benefits of joining the system and make the choice of whether to join on his own. Second,
opt-in systems place the burden on the system itself to gain individual participation. . . . First, “an optout system has the potential to be more valuable to the operator of the system than an opt-in system
because it will include more people by default. Second, an opt-out system allows for the existence of
systems that would otherwise be impracticable or prohibitively expensive. An opt-out system
accomplishes this by placing the burden on individuals to remove themselves from the system.”).
367. See Yanisky-Ravid & Hallisey, supra note 74.
368. WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF
NEW TECHNOLOGIES (2018).
369. KAMALA D. HARRIS & CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., PRIVACY ON THE GO: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE MOBILE ECOSYSTEM 1, 4 (2013), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy
/privacy_on_the_go.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CAK-44LG] (“Our recommendations, which in many
places offer greater protection than afforded by existing law, are intended to encourage all players in
the mobile marketplace to consider privacy implications at the outset of the design process.”).
370. See Yanisky-Ravid & Hallisey, supra note 74, at 49.
371. See Knoll et al., supra note 76, at 640.
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C. Third Conclusion: We Need WIPO and International Guidelines
The internet is intrinsically global in nature, AI translation tools are
used worldwide, and international norms governing translations state that
they are derivative works whose copyright lies with the original author.
Therefore, to be effective, any solution to the issues raised must involve
WIPO. International lawmakers must consult with one another, examining
the ways in which different jurisdictions have handled conflicts between
new web-based technology online and copyright law and working together
to set new guidelines for AI translations.
This framework aims to support the public’s right to communicate
freely and engage with others on the web while protecting the rights of
authors to profit from their original creative endeavors for a limited time.
To the extent that we propose restrictions on the automatic translation of
material, we do so also to emphasize the value of cultural diversity in all
its nuances, which machines can never understand, let alone accurately
replicate. Taken to extremes, copyright law can be a burdensome
restriction on creativity and speech, but there is no need to seek an extreme
solution here, and authors should not be forced to abandon all rights on the
internet. Further, when we allow ourselves to be dazzled by AI translation
technology, we not only ignore copyright, but we also lose sight of its
inaccuracies and biases. In short, by paying a little more attention to these
problems, lawmakers could readily solve them.
VII. EPILOGUE
The increased availability of translation services online has made it
necessary for copyright law to address the unique issues such services raise
concerning authors’ moral rights and rights of reproduction and
translation, balanced against the desirable goal of providing people
worldwide with access to culture and ideas. Translation provides a useful
linguistic tool in contexts that do not require perfect fluency, but its
unrestrained use propagates biased language, violates authors’ rights, and
damages the market for high-quality translations (to the detriment of
authors, translators and the general public). Therefore, the law should
impose limits on the type and amount of material which for-profit
companies may translate automatically online, amending the fair use
doctrine to reference AI translations explicitly. It should also demand that
AI translation software programmers implement fair use by design, in
addition to privacy by design. The internet is global and so are languages;
thus, WIPO should establish clear international guidelines concerning
machine translation.
As we increasingly come to rely upon AI translation platforms, we
should not lose sight of their weaknesses. Though certain readings of the
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story of Babel may invite us to mourn the loss of a single language, others
recognize that good translations celebrate global difference and depend
upon the considerable linguistic dexterity, cultural fluency, and creative
effort of translators.

